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NEWTON COUNTY WILDLF7E ASSOCIATION v. ROGERS: WHO
IS TAKING A "HARD LOOK" AT THE ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT OF TIMBER SALES?

I.

INTRODUCTION

Like all other administrative agencies, the United States Forest
Service is presumed to have superior knowledge to that of the
courts and the public concerning the impact of proposed projects
on the environment.' Thus, when environmental groups and individuals challenge a final agency action, courts often limit the scope
ofjudicial review to the agency's administrative record. 2 In Newton
1. See Susannah T. French, Comment, JudicialReview of the Administrative Record in NEPA Litigation, 81 CAL. L. REv. 929-33 (1993) (focusing on problems facing
environmental protection when reviewing courts concede all investigative power to
federal agencies based on premise of superior agency knowledge of environment,
and noting courts must struggle to balance discretion given to agencies to perform
judicial duties and enforcement of law); Michael Goodman, Comment, Forest Service Appeals Reform: Searchingfor Meaningful Review, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 117, 119-21
(1994) (discussing nearly unlimited discretion given to United States Forest Service by courts, thereby leaving room for agency bias, bad faith and abuse of
power).
See also, e.g.,
Marsh v. Oregon Nat'l Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377
(1989) (stating even when plaintiff or public expresses disagreement with opinions
of agency specialists, "an agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable
opinions of its own qualified experts even if ... a court might find contrary views
more persuasive"); Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. United States Forest
Serv., 88 F.3d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating court must defer to Forest Service
expertise particularly "when questions of scientific methodology are involved")
(emphasis added); Northwest Motorcycle Ass'n v. United States Dept. of Agric., 18
F.3d 1468, 1476 (9th Cir. 1994) (giving complete deference to Forest Service in
assessing public comment); in Northwest Motorcycle Ass'n, the Ninth Circuit stated:
As the fact-finder in this case, the [Forest Service] Defendants were in the
best position to determine the credibility of the comments offered by the
public establishing the existence of 'user conflict' in the . . . [area]. Sitting as an appellate court in this matter, the court will not reverse the
Defendants' implicit determination ....
Id.; Sierra Club v. Robertson, 810 F. Supp. 1021, 1027 (W.D. Ark. 1992) (stating
Forest Service's actions are presumed to be correct and court will give deference to
agency's "expertise and judgment") (citations omitted); Sierra Club v. Robertson,
784 F. Supp. 593, 601 (W.D. Ark. 1991) ("'it is imprudent for the generalistjudges
of the federal district courts... to consider testimonial and documentary evidence
bearing on those questions unless the evidence has first been presented to and
considered by the agency"'). In Robertson, the district court directed, "[i]f the
agency acted improperly, the remedy 'is to order the agency to hold a proper
hearing - not for the court to hold a hearing itself.'" Id. (citations omitted).
2. See Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. Rogers, 141 F.3d 803, 807 (8th Cir.
1998) (following Supreme Court view that judicial review of agency action is normally limited to agency's administrative record, which was prepared by agency at
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County Wildlife Ass'n v. Rogers (Wildlife Ass'n II), 3 the United States
Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, upheld this view by limiting its
review of four agency approved timber sales in Ozark National Park
to the Forest Service's record. 4 In so doing, the court ignored evidence of the timber sales' environmental impact and alternatives
that the appellant environmental groups and individuals
presented. 5 The appellants, therefore, were unable to introduce
this extrinsic evidence to prove the agency's record was
6
incomplete.
Other circuit courts routinely permit extrinsic evidence to supplement an agency's administrative record when reviewing the environmental impact of a final agency action. 7 In fact, federal district
time project was assessed); Lockhart v. Kenops, 927 F.2d 1028, 1036 (8th Cir.
1991) (noting court's role in reviewing final agency action is to determine whether
agency considered information available to it at time decision was made to approve
proposed project). See also French, supra note 1, at 929 (pointing to judicial deference to agency decisions as one reason why courts confine review of agency action
to administrative record).
3. 141 F.3d 803, 802-07 (8th Cir. 1998). For a discussion of the facts and
holding of Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. Rogers (Wildlife Ass'n I1), see infra notes 7488 and accompanying text.
4. See id. For a discussion of the court's analysis concerning the standard of
review, see infra notes 89-102 and accompanying text.
5. See id. The Eighth Circuit dismissed the appellants' three claims that evidence of probable and actual environmental impact should be allowed to supplement the administrative record. See id. Subsequently, because the court adopted
strict record review, all six of appellants' statutory-based claims were dismissed. See
id. at 808-11. For a discussion of the Eighth Circuit's analysis and dismissal of appellants' claims in Wildlife Ass'n II, see infra notes 103-131 and accompanying text.
6. See id. at 807-08 (dismissing appellants' claims on basis of findings in Forest
Service's record). This Note focuses on appellants' claim that the administrative
record was incomplete because the Forest Service failed to follow the National
Environmental Protection Act's (NEPA) procedural requirements, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4370(d) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996), and the National Forest Management Act
(NFMA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996). See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141
F.3d at 809 (determining whether Forest Service violated NEPA by failing to follow
procedural requirements in approving four proposed timber sales in Ozark National Forest).
7. See French, supra note 1, at 948-50 & nn. 147-62 (discussing circuit and
district court decisions allowing extrinsic evidence to supplement record review in
NEPA cases). The D.C., Second, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh circuits
allow outside evidence to supplement the administrative record in cases similar to
Wildlife Ass'n II. See, e.g., Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508,
1520 n.22 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming district court's admittance of plaintiffs expert's affidavit to understand complex issues in case); North Buckhead Civic Ass'n
v. Skinner, 903 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir. 1990) (allowing plaintiffs' witnesses to testify at
district court hearing); Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1090 n. 17 (10th Cir.
1988) (relying on district court's conclusions "[b]ased on evidence and testimony
adduced at trial ..."); Webb v. Gorsuch, 699 F.2d 157, 159 n.2 (4th Cir. 1983)
(stating "courts generally have been willing to look outside the record when assessing the adequacy of an EIS or a determination that no EIS is necessary"); Izaak
Walton League of Am. v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 369 n.56 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating
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and appellate courts have created a broad exception to strict record
review in environmental cases. 8 These exceptions call into question
whether or not a court's review of agency actions should be limited
to the administrative record prepared by that same agency. 9 In
other words, are courts overlooking the true environmental impact
of agency actions when the boundaries of judicial review are confined to the agency's own administrative record?
Part II of this Note examines the relevant federal statutes and
cases pertaining to Wildlife Ass'n II and the dispute over limiting
judicial review to an agency's administrative record.' 0 Part III sets
forth the factual and procedural history of Wildlife Ass'n II1' Part
"[a]llegations that an impact statement fails to consider serious environmental
consequences or realistic alternatives raise issues sufficiently important to warrant
introduction of new evidence in the District Court"); Sierra Club v. Hassell, 636
F.2d 1095, 1097-98 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding "[a] reviewing court is to review the
administrative records as well as other evidence to determine whether the agencies
adequately considered the values set forth in NEPA and the potential environmental effects of the project before reaching a decision on whether an environmental
impact statement was necessary" when referring to a court record consisting of
"voluminous administrative records, depositions and affidavits, and a transcript of
the testimony before the district court .. ."); County of Suffolk v. Secretary of
Interior, 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977) (allowing plaintiffs bringing claims under
NEPA to introduce new evidence). For a discussion of County of Suffolk and other
courts' opinions allowing extrinsic evidence in NEPA cases, see infra notes 66-73
and accompanying text.
8. See French, supra note 1, at 948-53 & nn.154-62, 166 (citing courts in note 7,
supra, as well as others, accepting broad exception to record review). For example,
in Izaak, the D.C. Circuit cited County of Suffolk in creating a broad exception to
record review of agency action:
By referring to APA [Administrative Procedure Act] and the Supreme
Court's decision in Overton Park, we do not mean to imply that judicial
review of [a final EIS] should be limited to the contents of the original
administrative record, or that the District Court erred when it decided to
permit introduction of new evidence. Suits challenging environmental
impact statements seek to ensure compliance with a statute other than
the APA. The reviewing court must ensure that the agency decision adequately discusses environmental effects and alternatives. Allegations that
an impact statement fails to consider serious environmental consequences or realistic alternatives raise issues sufficiently important to warrant introduction of new evidence in the District Court.
Izaak, 655 F.2d at 369 n. 56 (citation omitted). This exception to limiting judicial
review to the administrative record occurs largely in cases challenging final agency
action under NEPA. See French, supranote 1 at 939. For a discussion of the circuit
trends since the 1970s, both limiting and expanding judicial review of administrative decisions, see infra notes 45-73 and accompanying text.
9. Cf at 933 (stating, "[a] thoughtless or rigid application of the record rule
would serve to undercut meaningful judicial review of agency action under
[NEPA,] one of the United States' most important environmental statutes").
10. For a discussion of the relevant federal statutes and case law pertaining to
Wildlife Ass'n II, see infra notes 15-73 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the facts and procedural history of Wildlife Ass'n II, see
infra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
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IV addresses the Eighth Circuit's analysis of the case. 12 Part V considers the Wildlife Ass'n
court's decision in light of the relevant
case law and statutory provisions, concentrating on the court's holding that its review of the Forest Service's approval and assessment of
the timber sales was limited to the administrative record.1 3 Finally,
Part VI focuses on the potential negative environmental impact that
the Wildlife Ass'n H court's decision will have on the Forest Service's
4
consideration and approval of future timber sales.'

II.

A.

BACKGROUND

National Forest Management Act and National
Environmental Protection Act: Protection of the
Environment Through Required Agency Studies

The National Forest Management Act (NFMA)' 5 requires the
Forest Service to develop "Land and Resource Management Plans"
(Forest Plans) for all national forests.' 6 The Forest Service then
12. For a discussion of the Wildlife Ass'n II court's analysis, see infra notes 89131 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the Eighth Circuit's holding as it compares to other
case law and statutory provisions, see infra notes 132-159 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the Wildlife Ass'n II decision's impact, see infra notes
160-77 and accompanying text.
15. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
16. See id. § 1604(a). NFMA directs the Secretary of Agriculture to "develop,
maintain, and, as appropriate, revise land and resource management plans for
units of the National Forest System .... " Id. A Land and Resource Management
Plan (Forest Plan) must establish the overall management direction for the forest
unit for ten to fifteen years. See id. § 1604(k); see generally 36 C.F.R. § 200, 217.1219.29 (1998) (accompanying NFMA); Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753, 755
(8th Cir. 1994) (defining Forest Plan according to NEPA). Thus, the Forest Plan is
a statement of intent that sets forth guidelines and planning elements that the
Forest Service will employ when making future site-specific decisions. See Robertson,
28 F.3d at 755.
The method for developing a Forest Plan is set forth in Forest Service regulations made pursuant to NFMA. See id. The Plan is developed according to a twostage process. First, the Forest Supervisor commands a team that develops a proposed Forest Plan along with a draft and final EIS. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(a)-(b).
In accordance with NEPA, the drafting team must formulate and evaluate a broad
range of alternative management scenarios with the goal of "identifying the alternative that comes nearest to maximizing net public benefits." Id. § 219.12(f).
Next, the Regional Forester reviews the proposal and either approves or rejects it.
See id. § 219.10(c). If the Forest Plan and EIS are approved, the Regional Forester's Record of Decision supplements the reports. See id. § 219.4(b) (2).
The second stage begins when individual projects, such as timber sales, are
proposed and assessed according to the Forest Plan. See Sierra Club, 28 F.3d at 755.
The Forest Service must ensure that all projects are consistent with the plan. See 16
U.S.C. § 1604(i). Finally, the Forest Service conducts additional NEPA analysis,
preparing environmental assessments (EAs) and possibly project EISs, to determine the effects of the specific proposed projects and to consider alternative ac-
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assesses individual projects, such as timber sales, according to the
Forest Plans. 17 In addition, NFMA requires that the Forest Plans
comply with the policies of the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act
(MUSYA) 18 and the provisions of the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). 19 MUSYA generally directs that national forests "be administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber,
watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes." 20 Additionally, under
tions. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.16. For discussion of additional NEPA analysis required,
see infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
17. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i). For a discussion of the process by which individual projects are assessed according to the Forest Plan, see supra note 16 (explaining second step of Forest Plan process).
18. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1994). Sections 1 and 2 of the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act (MUSYA) provide a broad policy statement of land-use management values. See id. §§ 528-29. Section 1 prescribes the purposes in establishing
and administering national forests; section 2 directs that the administration of national forests is for "the multiple use and sustained yield" of these purposes and
that "due consideration shall be given to the relative values of the various resources
in particular areas." Id. § 529. Congress incorporated the policies of MUSYA into
the planning process in NFMA, providing that "the National Forest System shall be
maintained in appropriate forest cover with species of trees, degree of stocking,
rate of growth, and conditions of stand designed to secure the maximum benefits
of multiple use sustained yield management in accordance with land management
plans." 16 U.S.C. § 1601 (d) (1); see also 36 C.F.R. § 219.1; Goodman, supra note 1,
at 119-21 (explaining issues confronting current land management practices as
mandated by MUSYA and arguing that MUSYA gives Forest Service overly broad
discretion in administration of national forests and does not establish enforceable
standards for Forest Service to implement Act's goals); Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325
F. Supp. 99 (D. Alaska 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. (holding Forest Service
required by MUSYA to perform only cursory consideration of national forest uses
in response to plaintiffs contention that Forest Service managed Tongess National
Forest almost solely for timber purposes). Although this Note focuses upon the
requirements NEPA places on the Forest Service, the policy issues MUSYA presents
are similar.
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(c) (1994). For a discussion of NEPA's procedural
and substantive requirements on administrative agencies and the Forest Service,
specifically, see infra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
In addition, when assessing the proposed timber sales in Ozark National Forest, in the Wildlife Ass'n Hlcase, the Forest Service was required to follow the Arkansas Wilderness Acts of 1964 and 1984. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 810 (citing 16
U.S.C. § 1133(b); PUB. L. No. 98-508, 98 Stat. 2349 (1984)). "The Wilderness Act
of 1964 makes agencies that administer wilderness areas responsible for preserving
their wilderness character. The . . . Act of 1984 designated parts of the Ozark

National Forest as wilderness areas." Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 810 (citations
ommitted).
20. 16 U.S.C. § 528. These listed uses for national forests obviously contradict
each other and often lead to imbalance by the Forest Service when implementing
timber sales. See Goodman, supra note 1, at 121-22 (noting MUSYA gives little guidance to Forest Service in evaluating multiple uses in administration of national
forests). Goodman also remarks that the Forest Service's task in balancing
MUYSA's prescribed forest uses, while under the increasing pressure in this decade
from the timber industry and environmental groups alike, is insurmountable. See
id. at 118 (arguing judicial review needed to aid and check Forest Service's decisions made under insurmountable weight).
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NEPA, the Forest Service must promote prevention or elimination
of "damage to the environment and biosphere," when developing a
21
Forest Plan for any national forest.

In order to minimize damage to the environment, NEPA requires all federal agencies to prepare an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS),22 a "detailed statement" for all "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."23 If an agency is uncertain whether a project's impact will
significantly affect the environment, it must prepare an initial Environmental Assessment (EA).24 An EA analyzes and compares several alternative courses of action for a proposed project, including
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347. The language of NEPA makes Congress's intent
clear: "to the fullest extent possible ... the policies, regulations, and public laws of
the United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the
policies set forth in this chapter," such as "attain[ing] the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation." 42 U.S.C. § 4331-32.
The principle Senate sponsor of NEPA, Senator Henry M. Jackson, described
NEPA as "'a Congressional declaration that we do not intend, as a government or
as a people, to initiate actions which endanger the continued existence or the
health of mankind [or] do irreparable damage to the air, land and water which
support life on earth."' Philip Weinberg, It's Time to Put NEPA Back on Course, 3

N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 99, 101 (quoting 115 Cong. Rec. 40, 416 (1969)).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 4332. Although the language of NEPA makes Congress's intent clear, as discussed in note 21 infra, the Supreme Court has emphasized
NEPA's requirement that agencies prepare EISs instead of promoting environmental goals. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223,
227 (1980) (holding "once an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to ensure that the agency has
considered the environmental consequences; it cannot 'interject itself within the
area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken."')
(quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1974)). See also, Weinberg,
supra note 21, at 99 (arguing Supreme Court erroneously concluded NEPA is procedural in nature, not substantive, despite obvious congressional intent).
23. 42 U.S.C. §4332 (2) (C) (ii). The NEPA provisions require EISs to address
unavoidable "adverse environmental effects" of a major agency action, "alternatives
to the proposed action," short-term and long-term effects of the action, and "any
irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources" that could occur if the
action were implemented. Id. § 4332 (2) (C) (ii)-(v). In addition, the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations, which interpret NEPA and are binding
on all federal agencies, explicitly require agencies to discuss mitigation measures
in an EIS. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508, 1500.3, 1508.25(b) (1998). See also French,
supra note 1, at 945-48 (summarizing NEPA's requirements on administrative
agencies).
24. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a) (1). The CEQ regulations state:
EnvironmentalAssessment.

(a) Means a concise public document for which a Federal agency is responsible that serves to:
(1) Briefly provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining
whether to prepare an environmental impact statement or a finding of
no significant impact.
(2) Aid an agency's compliance with the Act when no environmental impact statement is necessary.
(3) Facilitate preparation of a statement when one is necessary.
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doing nothing, called the "No Action" alternative or "finding of no
significant impact" (FONSI). 25 Thus, if an agency issues an EA and
FONSI, the agency need not prepare an EIS for a proposed project
because it either is not a "major Federal action" or will not "signifi26
candy affect the quality of the human environment."
A unique situation arises when the Forest Service deals with
both NFMA and NEPA. 27 First, in compliance with NEPA, Forest
Service regulations require that a draft and final EIS accompany
(b) Shall include brief discussions of the need for the proposal, of alternatives ....
of the environmental impacts of the proposed action and
alternatives, and a listing of agencies and persons consulted.
Id. § 1508.9(a)-(b).
An initial EA must consider "both quasi-political factors (including the unique
characteristics of the area and the controversy surrounding the decision) and scientific questions (such as the uncertainty of the environmental effects and the
cumulative impact of the project)." French, supra note 1, at 946 (footnote omitted). See also Cronin v. United States Dep't of Agric., 919 F.2d 439, 443 (7th Cir.
1990) (defining EA as "rough-cut, low-budget environmental impact statement
designed to show whether a full-fledged environmental impact statement . . . is
necessary").
25. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e).
26. Id. FONSI may be determined by the agency if it finds either that the
environmental impacts of the proposed project are not significant or that the action to be taken is not "major." See id. The most widely asserted claim in NEPA
cases is that the agency should have prepared an EIS or that the EIS was prepared
inadequately. See French, supranote 1, at 947; COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT

app. B at 392 (1990) (noting two most common complaints

from 1974 to 1988 were failure to prepare EIS and inadequate preparation of EIS).
This is not surprising, considering that the agency makes the determination and
has no check on its authority until an appeal is brought before it. See Goodman,
supra note 1, at 155 (arguing Forest Service's power continues to have no check in
courts). Adding to the agencies' power to determine whether proposed actions
need to be evaluated is the principle of judicial deference to final agency decisions. See French, supra note 1, at 930 (explaining that following Supreme Court's
lead, "courts have historically used the same criteria that appellate courts employ
in reviewing district court decisions-the agencies are deemed to the key fact-finders, while the courts focus on the legality of the [sic.] actions") (citations omitted).
Likewise, cases challenging Forest Service Plans' adequacy often dispute
whether an additional EIS should have been drafted to support individual EAs
drafted for timber sales areas after the Forest Plan EIS was created. See Sierra Club
v. United States Forest Serv., 46 F.3d 835, 835-39 (8th Cir. 1995). This is also an
issue in the Note case, Wildlife Ass'n II. For a discussion of the NEPA issue in Wildlife Ass'n II, see infra notes 112-17 & 132-52 and accompanying text.
27. The Forest Service is frequently challenged under NEPA, not only because the Act is the most extensive environmental legislation Congress has passed,
but also because the notice and comment process the Forest Service itself requires,
promotes public awareness of major agency projects. Cf. Goodman, supra note 1,
at 118 (explaining environmental and conservation groups actively challenge timber sales because Forest Service fails to create reasonable and neutral plans that
balance timber output with other proscribed uses of national forests); French,
supra note 1, at 955-56 n.182 (noting because of importance of Act, "'NEPA became the most frequently-litigated of the environmental policies passed during the
Sixties and Seventies.'") (citing LEAH J. WILDS, UNDERSTANDING WHO WINS: ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 27 (1990)).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999

7

554

Villanova Environmental
Law Journal, Vol.
10, JOURNAL
Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 7[Vol. X: p. 547
LAW
VILLANOVA
ENVIRONMENTAL

each Forest Plan. 28 Second, because the Forest Service prepares an
EIS to accompany each Forest Plan, courts generally consider the
preparation of a EIS for a major Federal action unnecessary when a
project is proposed in the planned area.2 9 Instead, the Forest Service normally completes EAs for each proposed action within a na-

tional forest, and, in conjunction with EAs, frequently issues
FONSIs.3 0 Third, Forest Service regulations require periods of public comment when an action is proposed and approved by the
agency.3 1 These comment periods increase the potential for suits
28. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(b). A Forest Plan is clearly a major Federal action
of the type described in section 4332(2) (C) of NEPA. After the EIS is prepared,
CEQ regulations order that impacts be discussed "inproportion to their significance." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2(b). The EIS must also address direct and reasonably
foreseeable indirect ecological, aesthetic, cultural, historic, economic, social or
health-related effects and their significance. See id. §§ 1502.16 & 1508.8. In addition, the EIS must respond to comments from any outside party either by modifying its alternatives, data, or analysis, or explaining why modification is not
necessary. See id. § 1503.4(a). Lastly, a Record of Decision must be prepared,
identifying the proposed action and all alternatives and factors the agency considered. See id. §§ 1502.2, 1502.19. See also French, supra note 1, at 945-46 (summarizing regulations prescribing EIS preparation).
29. See, e.g.,
Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 809 (concluding appellants' NEPA
claim that EIS assessing cumulative effect of four timber sales should have been
prepared by Forest Service was without merit); Sierra Club, 46 F.3d at 837-38 (finding EIS was not required for project because Forest Supervisor made finding of no
significant impact after assessing EA's); Lockhart v. Kenops, 927 F.2d 1031-32 (8th
Cir. 1991) (holding Forest Service complied with NEPA by revising EAs instead of
developing EIS); Marble Mountain Audubon Soc'y v. Rice, 914 F.2d 179, 182 (9th
Cir. 1990) (dismissing plaintiff's allegations that EIS failed to consider preservation for wildlife); Save the Yaak Comm. v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding EA did not overlook significant environmental impact).
But see, e.g.,
House v. United States Forest Serv., United States Dep't of Agric.,
974 F.Supp. 1022, 1035, n.24 (E.D. Ky. 1997) (holding Forest Service required to
prepare EA because biological assessment showed inadequate consideration of effects on Indian Bat); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Duvall, 777 F.
Supp. 1533, 1540 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (finding "given that the government's premise
is unsupportable either as a matter of verifiable fact or as a matter of logic, the
FONSI based on the premise is unreasonable ...the FONSI suffers from a variety
of... deficiencies."); People ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Marsh, 687 F. Supp. 495, 501
(N.D. Cal. 1988) (holding EA "did not adequately address the wetlands, wildlife,
and endangered species impacts, water quality impacts, cumulative impacts, or the
adequacy of the mitigation proposal").
30. See, e.g., WildlifeAss'n II, 141 F.3d at 807 (accepting Forest Service's determination of FONSI after completion of EAs); Sierra Club, 46 F.3d at 839 (holding
although EA's findings not elaborate, nothing in record suggested need for additional analysis and, therefore, EA consideration of environmental impact not "so
deficient as to make the Forest Service's FONSI arbitrary and capricious"); Lockhart, 927 F.2d at 1031 (finding EA with FONSI prepared by Forest Service meant
no EIS was required under NEPA). For a discussion of the EA process prescribed
by NEPA, see supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
31. See 36 C.F.R. § 215. The Forest Service is required to mail notices to portions of the public as part of its mandatory appeals process. See id. Before implementation, Forest Plans, as well as proposed timber sales, require a "notice and
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based upon the Forest Service's preparation of the EIS and EAs because the public is made aware of the potential environmental affects of a project before any action takes place.32 Fourth, courts
commonly extend liberal judicial deference to Forest Service decisions on whether a project EIS is necessary when the Forest Service
has already developed Forest Plans covering land areas in which
33
projects will take place.
comment" process. Id. § 215.3(a)&(b). The Forest Plan and proposed timber
sales must be published in a newspaper of general circulation according to section
215.5 (b)(1), and notice must be sent to persons who have requested it or who are
known to have "participated in the environmental analysis process" or "in the decision[-]making process" under section 215.5(b)(2)(i)&(ii). Id. §§ 215.5(b)(1),
215.5(b)(2)(i) & (ii). Next, before enacting a project, the Forest Service is required to address public comments submitted during a thirty-day comment period.
Id. § 215.6(d). Then, after a decision is issued, only those individuals who have
"provided comment or otherwise expressed an interest in particular proposed project by the close of the comment period" may participate in the administrative
appellate procedure. Id. § 215.11(a).
32. See French, supra note 1, at 990 (noting suits challenging agency EIS and
EA preparation most frequent); Goodman, supra note 1, at 118 (arguing Forest
Service regulations on public comment periods benefit agency by delaying court
action). Goodman argues that the amended notice and comment process, contained in 36 C.F.R. §§ 215-217.17, unfairly benefits the Forest Service. See Goodman, supra note 1, at 147-55. The thirty-day comment period is too short for
challengers to construct all claims against the action in order to appeal to the
Forest Service. See id. at 151. Thus, challengers do not have adequate time and
resources to bring all concerns to the Forest Service's attention at the time the
decision is made to implement the agency action, while the Forest Service has
additional time "to bolster" its decisions. See id. at 147-51.
Furthermore, when courts adhere to strict record review, judges rely on the
agency's decision-making process to address appellants' concerns; thus, if appellants' concerns are not raised or addressed by the agency, the notice and comment
regulations may hinder complete judicial review of an agency's final action. See id.
at 152-53. See also, Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 808 (forbidding consideration of
new evidence because all concerns should have been raised when agency made its
decision) (citing Lockhart v. Kenops, 927 F.2d 1028, 1036 (8th Cir. 1991); Roanoke River Basin Ass'n v. Hudson, 940 F.2d 58, 63-64 (4th Cir. 1991) (disallowing
evidence not presented to Forest Service during administrative comment period
and appeals process).
33. See French, supra note 1, at 930 (explaining historically courts have given
great deference to administrative agencies' decisions). By excluding contradictory
extrinsic evidence and focusing solely upon the administrative records of agencies,
the First, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits have often deferred to agency decisions. See id. at 953-54. See also cf Goodman, supra note 1, at 119-21 (arguing
historically courts' deference to Forest Service too great). The Eighth Circuit in
Wildlife Ass'n II and other recent cases grants practically unlimited deference to the
Forest Service in approving timber sales. See, e.g., Gregson v. Untied States Forestry
Serv., 19 F. Supp. 2d 925, 927, 930 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (citing Wildlife Ass'n II in
determining Forest Plan EIS and individual EAs were adequate because of volume
and consideration of environmental impact and alternatives); Wildlife Ass'n II, 141
F.3d at 807 (finding district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting its review
of final agency action to "voluminous" administrative record); Missouri Coalition
for the Env't v. Corps of Eng'rs of the United States Army, 866 F.2d 1025, 1032-33
(8th Cir. 1989) (concluding volume of record, concerning environmental impact
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Standard of Review under the Administrative Procedure Act

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)3 4 governs judicial review of final agency action.3 5 APA, in relevant part, states that a
court may set aside a final agency decision if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law." 36 In a line of cases beginning with Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe 37 the Supreme Court considers this standard of review
narrow, and, therefore, holds that judges are not empowered to
substitute their own judgment for that of an agency.3 8 In addition,
of dredged or fill material into area wetlands, plus consideration of twenty-eight
alternatives in EA showed EIS was not needed). For a discussion of circuit cases
granting judicial deference to administrative agencies, see infra notes 51-65 and
accompanying text.
34. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Congress passed APA in
1946 to create a standard body of law applicable to administrative agencies, partially to safeguard private interests against quickly growing agency power. See
French, supra note 1, at 936-37. APA's provisions impose "procedural requirements on all federal agencies" and allow for "judicial review of agency actions to
protect against biased or inadequate investigations and arbitrary decisions." Id. at
937 (citing Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41-45, modified, 339 U.S. 908
(1950).
35. See 5 U.S.C. § 702. APA gives courts general authority to review the legality of administrative decisions. See French, supra note 1, at 936-37 (stating APA's
arbitrary and capricious standard is standard of judicial review for NEPA and
NFMA actions). The Supreme Court states that judicial review of administrative
decisions is available where "there is no indication that Congress sought to prohibit judicial review and there is . ..no 'showing of "clear and convincing evidence" of a ...legislative intent' to restrict access to judicial review." Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1970) (quoting Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) (quoting Brownell v. WeShung,
352 U.S. 180, 185 (1956))).
Additionally, in most cases, a reviewing court must refuse to conduct APA review of an administrative record when a plaintiff challenging the agency action has
failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. See, e.g., Gregson v. United States
Forestry Serv., 19 F. Supp. 2d 925, 929 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (refusing to review agency
action because appellant failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before
bringing action in court) (citing Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137 (1993)); Sharps v.
United States Forest Serv., 28 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 1994)). Thus, judicial review is
sought under APA for final agency actions that have already been appealed to and
dismissed by the agency challenged. See, e.g., Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 806 (noting appellants' appeals to Forest Service dismissed before action brought to district
court). This requirement is also enumerated in the Forest Service's mandatory
appeals procedure. See 36 C.F.R. § 215. Section 215.20 specifies that an action in
federal court is premature absent exhaustion of administrative remedies. See id.
§ 215.20.
36. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A). According to APA, a court may set aside an agency
decision only when they are: (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with the law, (2) unconstitutional, (3) not authorized
by statute, (4) violative of established procedure, or (5) unsupported by substantial
evidence. See id. § 706(2) (A)-(E).
37. 401 U.S. 402 (1970).
38. See id. at 416 (establishing narrow standard of review under APA); see also
In re Collins Securities Corp., 145 B.R. 277, 283 (E.D. Ark. 1992) (concluding

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol10/iss2/7

10

1999]

Tuozzolo:
Newton County
WildlifeWILDLIFE
Association v.ASSOCIATION
Rogers: Who Is Taking a Har
NEWTON
COUNTY

the Court has previously held in Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United

States 9 that judicial review of final agency action is limited to the
40
administrative record.
To determine whether a final agency action is "arbitrary or capricious," the Supreme Court directs a reviewing court to conduct a
searching and careful inquiry into the specific facts of an agency
decision. 4 1 Ultimately, after carefully considering the relevant
data, 4 2 the reviewing court must determine whether the agency recscope of judicial review is narrow and must be confined to administrative record
and applicable law). See also French, supra note 1, at 939-40 (summarizing impact
of Overton Park decision on judicial review of agency action).
Several commentators argue APA did not contemplate a narrow restriction of
de novo review by citing its legislative history, while others note that administrative
law under APA was developed through common law. See French, supra note 1, at
929-30 & n.1 (citing Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative Common Law and the Vermont

Yankee Opinion, 1980 UTAH L. REv. 3, 3 (discussing legislative and common law
development of APA)).
39. 371 U.S. 156 (1962).
40. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985) (rejecting evidence offered by appellants to supplement administrative record and
ruling remand to agency is required except in rare situations when administrative
record is incomplete). If an agency's record does not support agency action, an
agency has not considered all relevant factors, or a reviewing court cannot evaluate
an agency's action on basis of its record, reviewing courts are to remand to the
agency. Id. See also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (holding focal point for
APAjudicial review should be agency's administrative record already in existence
at time action brought and, if record inadequate, proper remedy is to remand to
agency to articulate reason for actions).
41. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416. In Overton Park, the Supreme Court required the district court make a "searching and careful" factual inquiry to determine whether "the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors
and whether there has been a clear error ofjudgment." Id. at 416 (citations omitted). The Court, thus, established the "hard look" doctrine, by demanding courts
make "thorough, probing, in-depth review" of agency action. Id. at 415. See also
French, supra note 1, at 941 (arguing Overton Park's "hard look" doctrine shows
judicial willingness to place more stringent demands on agencies and to afford less
deference to agency power); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)
(noting reviewing court may not "'interject itself within the area of discretion of
the executive . . .'", but must ensure agency has taken "'hard look'" at relevant

data to its final decision) (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton,
458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
42. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415-20 (making no mention of what constitutes relevant data). Whether this relevant data comes only from the administrative record, or whether it is supplemented by extrinsic evidence, is left to the
discretion of the reviewing court. See id. at 416, 420-21. While the Court remanded Overton Park for review "based on the full administrative record that was
before the Secretary at the time he made his decision," the Supreme Court did not
expressly limit the district court's review of the agency action to the administrative
record. See id. at 420. See also French, supra note 1, at 941 (arguing Overton Park

Court left door open to record review exceptions when "'the bare record [does]
not disclose the factors that [the agency] considered or the [agency's] construction of the evidence'") (quoting Overton Park,401 U.S. at 420). It is clear, however,
that district and circuit courts still may not judge the substantive merits of an
agency's decision under Overton Park and other Supreme Court decisions even
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ord "articulate [s] a satisfactory explanation for its action including
a 'rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made."' 43 In applying this "hard look" doctrine, courts have not
agreed on the issue of whether judicial review is limited to the ad44
ministrative record.

though reviewing federal courts must ensure that the agency has taken a "hard
look" at the data relevant to its final decision. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood
Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980) ("[O]nce an agency has made
a decision subject to NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a court is
to insure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences; it cannot 'interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of
action taken.'") (quoting Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 390, 410 n.21).
43. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156,
168 (1962)). The Motor Vehicle Mfrs. court held that it must determine that the
evidence before the agency provided a rational and ample basis for the agency
decision, if the decision is to be upheld under the arbitrary and capricious standard of APA. See id. In practice, an agency can easily satisfy this rational basis
standard. See id. See also Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420 (establishing exception to
record review where record is insufficient to illuminate rationality of agency decision by allowing testimony of administrative officials on remand).
44. See French, supra note 1, at 958 (discussing circuit split on limiting judicial
review to administrative record in NEPA cases); e.g., County of Suffolk v. Secretary
of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1372-73 (2d Cir. 1977) (exemplifying broad view allowing extrinsic evidence to supplement administrative record); Cronin v. United
States Dep't of Agric., 919 F.2d 439, 442-44 (7th Cir. 1990) (exemplifying narrow
view limiting review to administrative record). Commentators and courts argue
judicial review of administrative records in light of opposing, extrinsic evidence is
crucial in NEPA cases to ensure that an agency has considered all relevant factors.
See French, supranote 1, at 958 (discussing circuit split over record review in NEPA
cases). See also Weinberg, supra note 21, at 99-108 (discussing and criticizing
Supreme Court's role in limiting review to record in NEPA cases).
According to the Supreme Court, reviewing courts must access the reasonableness (or arbitrariness) of an agency's compliance with NEPA by determining
whether it considered relevant factors. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416 (failing to
prescribe type of data reviewing court should consider in APA analysis under "hard
look" doctrine). When judicial review of final agency action is limited to the record, the scope of relevant factors is limited to those the agency considered, not all
relevant significant effects as NEPA mandates. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C). See also
French, supra note 1, at 957 (stating that courts allowing plaintiffs to introduce
new evidence will make more complete review of agencies decisions); MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 78-81

(1988) (arguing arbitrary standard will not lead courts to determination that all
relevant factors were considered in agency decisions).
As interpreted by the Wildlife Ass'n II court, the "hard look" doctrine requires
the reviewing court to find, after assuring the agency has taken a hard look at the
environmental impact of a project: (1) the agency that prepared the record identified the environmental concern raised by appellants, and (2) the record contains a
convincing statement that the concern was considered. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141
F.3d at 808. Then, if the court determines that the record has identified and considered the concern raised, the record is found not to be arbitrary or capricious.
See id. at 808-11.
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The Record on Review and the NEPA Exception

Circuit courts are divided on whether judicial review of a final
agency action is confined to the administrative record or whether
extrinsic evidence of environmental impact and alternatives may
also be considered, particularly in actions challenging agency decisions under NEPA. 4 5 The primary conflict focuses upon whether
NEPA should be classified as a procedural statute or a substantive
statute. 4 6 If courts interpret NEPA as merely procedural, judges
45. See, e.g., Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467 (5th Cir. 1973)
(permitting expansive judicial review of extrinsic evidence to determine whether
Forest Service followed NEPA procedure); but see, e.g., Cronin v. United States
Dep't of Agric., 919 F.2d 439, 444 (stating "[i]n short, only in an emergency
should a reviewing court, whether a district court or any other federal court, conduct its own evidentiary hearing" when reviewing final agency action). See also
French, supra note 1, passim; DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAw AND LITIGATION
§ 4.09[1] (2d ed. 1992) (discussing NEPA cases allowing and rejecting extrinsic
evidence on record review).
French and other commentators also argue that courts' traditional reasons for
interpreting APA review so narrowly do not apply in NEPA cases because each
leaves too much room for abuse under NEPA. See French, supra note 1, at 956.
The traditional reasons for limiting judicial review of final agency action under
APA to the administrative record are: (1) presumption of agency expertise, (2)
protection of agency independence, (3) public participation in agency decisionmaking, and (4) threat of sandbagging, i.e. withholding significant concerns and
information from an agency during the decision-making process and then blocking the project in court by claiming the agency ignored such significant information. See id. at 956-57 (discussing why traditional reasons for limiting review do not
apply to NEPA).
The reasoning within the circuit split is complicated because of the meager
discussions ofjudicial review in NEPA and the Act's minimal legislative history. See
French, supra note 1, at 956 n.184 (discussing passage and early implementation
of NEPA) (citing FREDERICK R. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS, at 13-14, 16
(1973). The Senate report on NEPA provides the only clear reference to judicial
review in the Act's legislative history. In pertinent part, the Report states that "the
,environmental' desires of the American people [must be defined] in operational
terms that the President, government agencies at all levels, the courts, private enterprise, and the public can consider to act upon." Id. (quoting SENATE COMM. ON
INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACr OF 1969, S.
REP. No. 296, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. 13 (1969)).
46. See Weinberg, supra note 21, at 99-108 (arguing trend advanced by
Supreme Court to restrict review of agency action to administrative record based
on incorrect interpretation of NEPA as substantive statute). See, e.g.,
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,
558 (1978) (stating in dictum, "NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals
for the Nation, but its mandate is essentially procedural"); but see, e.g., Sierra Club
v. Hassell, 636 F.2d 1095, 1097-98 (5th Cir. 1981) (interpreting NEPA as substantive mandate on agencies). In Hasse, the Fifth Circuit departed from the
Supreme Court trend and stated: "A reviewing court is to review the administrative
records as well as other evidence to determine whether the agencies adequately
considered the values set forth in NEPA and the potential environmental effects of
the project before reaching a decision on whether an environmental impact statement was necessary." Hassell 636 F.2d at 1097-98. In so stating, the Fifth Circuit
was presented with a record consisting of "voluminous administrative records, dep-
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must take a "hard look" at the agency decision to determine
whether it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law." 47 In the alternative, if courts
interpret NEPA as a substantive statute, judges must then determine not only whether agencies examined environmental impacts
and alternatives, but also mitigated impacts. 48 Courts addressing
the substantive issue of whether an agency has proceeded with a
final decision despite environmental impacts considered in the record, generally review the record in light of opposing extrinsic eviositions and affidavits, and a transcript of the testimony before the district court
...." Id.
47. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415; 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Usually, under the
procedural interpretation of NEPA, the fact that a given environmental impact is
mentioned in an EA or EIS will satisfy NEPA's procedural mandates. See French,
supra note 1, at 957-58 (noting unless challenged specifically, there is no minimum
standard by which a court can determine whether all relevant factors of environmental impact have been considered in the administrative record).
If a court takes a "hard look" at an agency's final decision to ensure that environmental impact and alternatives have been considered, it is not the same as
treating NEPA as a substantive statute. See Weinberg, supra note 21, at 105. Weinberg points out that even though the Supreme Court has stated in Strycker's Bay
that "'[a]n agency might well give the impacts of a proposal a hard look yet decide
to proceed despite those impacts ...

.'"

it fails to require agencies to mitigate those

impacts under NEPA. See id. (citing Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v.
Karlen, 444 U.S. at 223-27 (1980). In Missouri Coalitionfor Env't v. Corps of Eng'rs of
United States Army, the Eighth Circuit, following the Supreme Court's trend, stated
that NEPA is a procedural act and the court is to review whether the agency considered environmental effects, not the correctness of the agency decision. See 866 F.2d
1025, 1032-33 (8th Cir. 1989).
48. See Weinberg, supra note 21, at 105-06 ("The real issue [in Strycker's Bay
and other suits challenging agency compliance with NEPA] is whether NEPA mandates the agency not only to examine impacts but to mitigate those impacts as
well."). NEPA "directs that, to the fullest extent possible . . . the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in
accordance with" the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 4332. In addition, NEPA imposes the "responsibility . . . to use all practicable means . . . [to] attain the widest range of
beneficial uses of the environment without degradation . . . ." Id. § 4331 (b) (3).

Weinberg emphasizes Congress's intent to place substantive environmental goals
on agencies in enacting NEPA and argues courts must consider NEPA's purpose in
requiring agencies to prepare EIS and EA reports if the environment is to be protected. See Weinberg, supra note 21, at 101. In fact, the Eighth Circuit held in
EnvironmentalDefense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke that "[c] ourts have an obligation to review substantive agency decisions on the merits to determine if they are in accord
with NEPA .

. .

. [Including] whether the actual balance of costs and benefits

struck by the agency according to these [NEPA-imposed] standards.., clearly gave
insufficient weight to environmental factors." 473 F.2d 346, 353 (8th Cir. 1972)
(citing EnvironmentalDefense Fund v. Corps. of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 298-300 (8th Cir.
1972)). In EnvironmentalDefense Fund v. Corps. of Eng'rs, the Eighth Circuit court
held that "[t] he unequivocal intent of NEPA is to require agencies to consider and
give effect to the environmental goals set forth in the Act, not just to file detailed
impact studies which will fill governmental archives." 470 F.2d 289, 298 (8th Cir.
1972).
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dence. 49 While the Supreme Court has not clearly defined the
limits of admitting evidence to supplement administrative records
in NEPA cases, various Court decisions show a trend toward limitingjudicial review to the administrative record, and, in the process,
50
interpreting NEPA as a procedural statute.
1.

The Narrow View of the Seventh Circuit

Cronin v. United States Department of Agriculture (Cronin)51 af
firmed strict record review in NEPA cases by limiting judicial review
of federal agency action to the administrative record. 52 In Cronin,
individuals who frequented the Shawnee National Forest for recrea49. See French, supra note 1, at 957 (explaining NEPA documents usually contain errors of omission and evidence outside record must be admitted to check
accuracy of agency findings). Omissions do not appear on the face of the EIS or
EA that a court reviews in a suit claiming that an agency violated NEPA. See id. As
a result, in cases like Strycker's Bay, courts reject the Supreme Court's reasoning
that it is not ajudge's role to review extrinsic evidence when answers to appellants'
questions can not be found in the administrative record. See id.
50. See generally Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion,
470 U.S. 729 (1985); Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. 519. See also French, supra note 1, at
944 (explaining Court's preference for limiting review to administrative record is
based on deference to agency expertise, adequacy of records for judicial review,
and obligation of challenging parties to make objections to agency before court
action). French stresses that the Supreme Court has left room for exceptions to
the limit on review. See id. Even though the Court has not prohibited the admission of extrinsic evidence for judicial review, the scope and content of the exceptions are not clear to the district courts. See id. at 944-45.
Weinberg would characterize the Supreme Court's position as a rejection of
NEPA mandating substantive requirements. See Weinberg, supra note 20, at 105-08
(citing Strycker's Bay and Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332
(1989), as Court's ultimate neglect of NEPA's purpose). The shift in interpreting
NEPA as both a substantive and procedural mandate on agencies in cases such as
Froehlke and Corps. of Eng'rs to interpreting NEPA as solely a procedural requirement in Wildlife Ass'n II, illustrates the Supreme Court's disregard for congressional intent in enacting NEPA. Commentators, such as Weinberg, French and
Goodman argue that the switch in judicial interpretation of agency requirements
under NEPA also illustrates the need for a clear rule allowing extrinsic evidence in
judicial record review or amendment to NEPA by the legislature to assure that
NEPA's purpose is followed. See French, supra note 1, at 989-90; Goodman, supra
note 1, at 155; Weinberg, supra note 21, at 116.
51. 919 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1990).
52. See id. at 442-444. See, e.g., Valley Citizens for a Safe Env't v. Aldridge, 886
F.2d 458, 460 (1st Cir. 1989) (asserting only three exceptions to record review: (1)
where agency ignored important matter in EIS, (2) where agency improperly relied on secret information and (3) where extrinsic evidence would aid court in
"understanding highly technical, environmental matters"); Missouri Coalition for
Env't v. Corps of Eng'rs of United States Army, 866 F.2d 1025, 1031 (8th Cir. 1989)
(allowing "testimony of explanatory nature from agency" only when needed to
show reasonableness of agency decision, while excluding other new evidence). See
also French, supra note 1, at 954 (discussing Cronin's role in reviving record review
in NEPA cases in 1990's).
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fion appealed from a district court denial of their request for a preliminary injunction.53 The plaintiffs alleged that the Forest
54
Service's authorized timber sale violated both NEPA and NFMA.
The Seventh Circuit deferred to the forest supervisor's decision in
determining whether the sales complied with the statutes. 5 5 The
court held that "a reviewing court may... 'uphold a decision of less
than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned."15 6 The Cronin court concluded that under APA a reviewing court does not review evidence and "only in an emergency
57
should a reviewing court.., conduct its own evidentiary hearing.
The Eighth Circuit follows the Seventh Circuit's approach and
typically prohibits evidence to supplement the agency's administrative record when reviewing under APA "unless a plaintiff can make
a 'strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior.'"58 As explained in Northwest Motorcycle Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Agric.,5 9
review of a final agency plan under APA does not require fact finding on behalf of the court. 60 Consequently, the majority of Eighth
Circuit decisions limit review of agency actions to the administrative
61
record except in rare circumstances or emergency situations.
53. See Cronin, 919

F.2d at 441.

54. See id.
55. See id. at 442.

56. Id. (quoting Bowman Transp. Co. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Co., 419 U.S.
281, 286 (1974)). The Cronin court characterizes the standard of review by saying
"[t]hat undemanding standard is satisfied here - especially when allowance is
made for the fact that the decision is that of a local forest supervisor rather than of
the members of a sophisticated agency in Washington." Id.
57. Cronin, 919 F.2d at 442-444 (concluding when record is complete, plaintiffs must persuade court on basis of forest supervisor's decision not to accept
sales). The Cronin court interprets NEPA as merely a procedural statute. See id. at
445.
58. Maxey v. Kadrovach, 890 F.2d 73, 77 (8th Cir. 1989) (quoting Coming
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 736 F.2d 479, 481 (8th Cir.
1984)). See also, e.g., Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 807 (applying same bad faith
exception quoted in Maxey and limiting review to administrative record); City of
Richfield, Minnesota. v. F.A.A., 152 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 1998) (limiting review to
administrative record); Missouri Coalition for the Env't v. Corps of Eng'rs of the
United States Army, 866 F.2d 1025, 1031 (8th Cir. 1989) (allowing new evidence
only to show reasonableness of agency's action); Gregson v. United States Forestry
Serv., 19 F. Supp. 2d 925 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (following Wildlife Ass'n II decision in

limiting review to Forest Service's record); Heartwood, Inc. v. United States Forest
Serv., Inc., 999 F.Supp. 1286 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (limiting review to administrative
record); Monarch Chem. Works, Inc. v. Exon, 466 F. Supp. 639, 647 (D. Neb.
1979) (stating extrinsic evidence must be necessary for evaluating reasonableness
of agency's decision).
59. 18 F.3d 1468 (8th Cir. 1994).
60. See id. at 1476.
61. See Northwest Motorcycle, 18 F.3d at 1472 (concluding summaryjudgment is
appropriate in case that involves challenge to Forest Service's decision to close
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Other Eighth Circuit cases, however, suggest the reviewing court
may use outside evidence in its analysis of whether an agency's plan
is arbitrary or capricious. 62 Nevertheless, the recent decisions in
Wildlife Ass'n H and Gregson v. United States Forestry Serv. 6 3 limited judicial review of agency action to the administrative record and,
thus, recommenced the Seventh Circuit's "record rule" trend in the
64
Eighth Circuit.
2.

The Broad View of the Second Circuit

In County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior (County of Suffolk),65 the
Second Circuit broadened the standard of judicial review of final
agency actions by supplementing the administrative record with extrinsic evidence. 6 6 The County of Suffolk court considered whether
trails in designated forest area to ORV use because record presents no genuine
issues of material fact). See also Exon, 466 F. Supp. at 647 (restricting evidence
outside of record to that necessary to evaluate reasonableness of agency's decision); French, supra note 1, at 953 n.166 (listing Eighth Circuit first in those restricting evidence to record).
62. See Lockhart v. Kenops, 927 F.2d 1028, 1035 (8th Cir. 1991) (allowing
outside evidence to supplement administrative record). Earlier cases in the Eighth
Circuit, like Lockhart, allowed extrinsic evidence when reviewing an agency action.
See, e.g., Residents in Protest-I-35E v. Dole, 583 F. Supp. 653, 662 (D. Minn.
1984) (accepting expert testimony plaintiffs' and defendants' presented before district court); Como-Falcon Coalition, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 465 F.
Supp. 850, 856 n.1 (D. Minn. 1978) (recognizing need for extrinsic evidence in
NEPA cases), affd, 609 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980).
See also French, supranote 1, at 953 n.166 (contrasting broad view of earlier district
court decisions in Eighth Circuit with other recent cases).
63. 19 F. Supp. 2d 925 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
64. See id. at 928, 930 (citing Wildlife Ass'n I opinion concerning standard and
scope of review). In Gregson, plaintiffs challenged the Forest Service's proposal
and decision to harvest and sell timber, commercially thin pine areas, and conduct
other activities in Ozark National Forest under NFMA and NEPA. See id. at 928.
The court limited it's review to the administrative record and granted summary
judgment to the Forest Service under APA's "arbitary and capricious" standard. See
id. The Eighth Circuit's approach to record review after Wildlife Ass'n II is expressed in the analysis of the Gregson court:
The APA authorizes a reviewing court to set aside or hold unlawful any
action by an agency that is found to be "without observance of procedure
required by law." Additionally, when reviewing an administrative decision, the court examines whether the agency's decision was arbitrary and
capricious. In the context of a decision made by the Forest Service, the
court cannot "weigh the evidence independently and reach its own findings." Rather, the court's review is "limited to the record before the
agency" to determine whether the agency has taken a "hard look at the
environmental consequences of its actions."
Id. at 930 (citations omitted).
65. 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977).
66. Id. at 1372. The early 1970's trend stemmed from a belief that NEPA's
preservationist goals could only be upheld by a demanding standard of judicial
review of agency actions. See French, supra note 1, at 949 (arguing suits under
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the Department of Interior's EIS, assessing a program for exploration of oil and gas resources, satisfied NEPA.6 7 The court held the
record was insufficient and stated "in NEPA cases . . . a primary

function of the court is to insure that the information available to
the decision-maker includes an adequate discussion of environmental effects and alternatives, which can sometimes be determined
only by looking outside the administrative record to see what the
agency may have ignored. '68 Accordingly, the County of Suffolk
court supplemented the record with evidence presented by the
69
challengers of the agency action.
The Second Circuit, however, limited its use of extrinsic evidence in County of Suffolk. Such evidence was "probative only insofar as it tended to show either that the agency's research or analysis
was clearly inadequate or that the agency improperly failed to set
forth opposing views widely shared in the relevant scientific community. ' 70 Since the County of Suffolk decision, courts reviewing
agency decisions under NEPA have accepted the use of evidentiary
trials and hearings, expert witnesses, expert affidavits and other evidentiary documents. 71 These reviewing courts, like the County of
NEPA are unique because concerns of usurping agency power do not arise under
Act). Corresponding with the increase in NEPA actions against administrative
agencies, such as the Forest Service, some courts narrowed their review of agency
action. See cf Goodman, supra note 1, at 148 (noting rise in actions against Forest
Service for approving timber sales increased 600 percent from the late 1980s to
early 1990s). The Eighth Circuit exemplifies the narrowing of judicial review in
NEPA. First, allowing extrinsic evidence because of NEPA's policies, and then
flatly rejecting new evidence of environmental impact expect in extreme cases. See,
e.g., Envtl. Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps. of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 298-300 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973) (allowing extrinsic evidence in 1972); Gregson, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 928 (limiting review to administrative record except where
showing of agency bad faith or improper behavior).
67. See County of Suffolk, 562 F.2d at 1372 (deciding whether EIS contained
sufficient information concerning environmental impact and alternatives to program under section 102(2)(C) of NEPA). For a discussion of EIS requirements
under NEPA, see supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
68. Id. 562 F.2d at 1384 (citations omitted).
69. See id. at 1372.
70. Id. at 1385.
71. See, e.g., Sabine River Auth. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 951 F.2d
669, 678 (5th Cir. 1992); Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508,
1520 n.22 (9th Cir. 1992); North Buckhead Civic Ass'n v. Skinner, 903 F.2d 1533,
1534 (11th Cir. 1990); Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1090 n.17 (10th Cir.
1988); Park County Resources Council, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 817
F.2d 609, 614 (10th Cir. 1987); Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225, 1230 (5th
Cir. 1985); Sierra Club v. Hassell, 636 F.2d 1095, 1097-98 (5th Cir. 1981); City of
Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 675 (9th Cir. 1975); Colorado Envtl. Coalition v.
Lujan, 803 F. Supp. 364, 370-71 (D. Colo. 1992); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Duvall, 777 F. Supp 1533, 1534 n.1 (E.D. Cal. 1991); Oklahoma Wildlife
Fed'n v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 681 F. Supp. 1470, 1489 (N.D. Okla.
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Suffolk court, have nevertheless limited the type of extrinsic evi72
dence admitted.
III.

FACTS

In 1986, the United States Forest Service dispatched a ten-year
Forest Plan for Ozark National Forest. 73 Pursuant to NFMA and
NEPA, an EIS analyzing the environmental impact of timber sales
on the water, wildlife, fish and plant life in the wilderness area accompanied the Forest Plan.7 4 In the early 1990's, the Forest Service
proposed four timber sales in Ozark National Forest. 7 5 These sales

involved timber harvesting in 3,011 acres of the 1,118,500-acre forest and required 13.64 miles of road construction and 5.08 miles of
76
new road.
Prior to issuing the proposals, the Forest Service solicited comments and described the proposals by mailing notices to the public
for each sale. 77 After receiving responses to the mailings, the Forest

Service prepared Biological Evaluations of the probable effects on
known species in Ozark National Forest, as well as EAs, which evaluated assorted sale alternatives including the "no action" alternative,
or FONSI. 78 Then, the Forest Service circulated the EAs for further
1988); No Oilport! v. Carter, 520 F. Supp. 334, 346 (W.D. Wash. 1981). See also
French, supra note 1, at 950-52 & nn.156-64 (supporting NEPA cases allowing extrinsic evidence).
72. See French, supra note 1, at 943-44 (discussing narrowing effects of
Supreme Court trend). Courts limit the type of extrinsic evidence largely because
of the Supreme Court's decisions limiting judicial review of final agency actions.
Id. For further discussion of the Court's decisions, see supra notes 3744 and accompanying text.
73. See Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. Rogers, 141 F.3d 803, 806 (8th Cir.
1998) (discussing preliminary process which led to Forest Service approval of challenged timber sales). For a general discussion of the Forest Service's requirements
under NFMA for developing national Forest Plans, see supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
74. See id. The Wildlife Ass'n II court determined that the EIS was complete in
"analyzing the environmental consequences of timber sales, including the impact
of harvesting and road construction on water quality, wildlife and fish, wilderness
areas, and threatened, endangered, and sensitive wildlife and plant species." Id.
For a discussion of the Forest Service's EIS requirement, see supra notes 22-24, and
accompanying text.
75. Id. at 806. As determined by the Forest Plan, the proposed sales coincided with areas which yielded a high level of timber. See id.
76. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 806-07. The timber sales were referred to
as Sand Gap, Round Hill, Junction, and Sandy Springs. See id. at 806.
77. See id. at 807 (noting comment and notice period required by Forest Service regulations, 36 C.F.R. § 215). For a discussion of Forest Service's comment
and notice process, see supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
78. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 807, 810 (noting Forest Service prepared
Biological Evaluations in response to public comments according to ESA regula-
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public comment. 79 By the fall of 1995, the Forest Service approved
the sales. 80 On December 20, 1995, after appealing to the Forest
Service, Newton County Wildlife Association, the Sierra Club and
other interested parties (collectively Wildlife Association) filed suit
in the United States District Court, Eastern District Arkansas, West81
ern Division.
Wildlife Association sought to enjoin the timber sales in Ozark
National Forest by suing the United States Forest Service and four
of its employees.8 2 After being denied a preliminary injunction to
stop the sales, the appellants sought judicial review of the Forest
Service's final agency action in approving the four timber sales in
Ozark National Forest.8 3 In Wildlife Ass'n II, the Eighth Circuit aftions, 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (1998), and EAs as required by CEQ regulations, 40
C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(1)(1998)). For a discussion of Forest Service's regulations proscribing EA preparation and FONSI determination, see supra notes 25-26, and accompanying text.
79. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 807. The Forest Service requires the District Ranger to circulate EAs before determining whether a site-specific EISs must
be developed. See 36 C.F.R. § 215. The Eighth Circuit did not hold that the Forest
Service erred in deciding not to complete an EIS specifically for the four timber
sales. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 809.
80. See id. at 807. The Forest Service issued Decision Notices for two of the
sales on May 27, 1994, and administrative appeals to the approvals were rejected in
the fall of 1994; the sales took place shortly thereafter. See id. Similarly, the Forest
Service issued Decision Notices for the remaining two sales on May 22, 1995, and
the Forest Service rejected administrative appeals that fall. See id. For a discussion
of the Forest Supervisor's two-step approval procedure under NFMA, see supra
notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
81. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 807. Wildlife Association properly brought
the action to court after all administrative remedies were exhausted. See id. For a
discussion of challengers' requirements to exhaust administrative remedies under
APA in the case of the Forest Service and other agencies, see supra note 35. Here,
the Forest Service rejected all administrative appeals to the approved timber sales
before suit was brought in the United States District Court, Eastern District Arkansas, Western Division. See id.; Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. Rogers, 948 F. Supp.
50 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
82. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 806 (affirming all previous decisions related to present action). The first step in Wildlife Ass'n II's procedural history was
that the district court denied preliminary injunction under Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act or Migratory Bird Treaty Act. See Wildlife Ass'n I, 948 F. Supp. at 50; Newton
County Wildlife Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997).
Second, the Supreme Court of the United States denied petition for writ of certiorari on February 23, 1998. See Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. Rogers, 118 S. Ct.
1035 (1998). Third, this appeal submitted on December 10, 1997, challenged the
district court's decision to limit its review to the administrative record and summary judgment for the Forest Service, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 806. Fourth, the Supreme Court of Arkansas, sitting en banc, denied plaintiff's petition for certiorari on July 7, 1998. See
id. at 803.
83. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 807 (noting it was appellants' second appeal in this action). For a discussion of the case's procedural history, see supra
note 83. When the court received the second amended complaint for its review, it
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firmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
the Forest Service. 84 In so doing, the Eighth Circuit limited judicial
review to the administrative record.8 5 Ultimately, the Wildlife Ass'n
H court held that the district court correctly limited judicial review
to the administrative record 86 and that Wildlife Association's claims
8 7
were without merit.
IV.

NARRATIvE ANALYSIS

In the Wildlife Ass'n II decision, the Eighth Circuit confined judicial review to the administrative record when determining
whether the Forest Service's approval of the timber sales was "arbitrary or capricious. '8 8 The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district
court's decision to limit judicial review to the administrative record
before it. 8 9 Consequently, the Wildlife Ass'n II court excluded Wildlife Association's extrinsic evidence on the environmental impact of
post-sale logging and road construction. 90 In addition, the Eighth
noted, "Counsel for the Forest Service advised at oral argument that approximately
three-fourths of road work and timber harvesting in the four sale areas is now
completed." Wildlife Ass'n I, 141 F.3d at 807. For a discussion of the importance
of plaintiffs winning at the injunction stage of the judicial process, see infra notes
169-75 and accompanying text.
84. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 807.
85. See id. at 806. The Eighth Circuit excluded the extrinsic evidence appellants presented in affirming summary judgment in favor of the Forest Service. See
id. at 807.
86. See id. On the issue of scope of judicial review, the Wildlife Ass'n H court
held that "the district court did not abuse its discretion by conducting its judicial
review on the voluminous administrative record compiled by the Forest Service for
the four timber sales." Id. Thus, the court emphasized the record's volume, giving
broad deference to the Forest Service's decision and expertise. See Wildlife Ass'n II,
141 F.3d at 807.
87. See id. at 811 (determining claims without merit because each "considered" in Forest Service's record). Wildlife Association brought several claims
based upon alleged Forest Service violation of substantive statutes. See id. at 807
(listing statutes: (1) Wild & Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA), (2) National Forest Management Act (NFMA), (3) National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), (4) Clean
Water Act, (5) Wilderness Act, and (6) Endangered Species Act (ESA)). The
Eighth Circuit reasoned that Wildlife Association failed to relate each argument to
APA standard of review. See id. For a discussion of the Wildlife Ass' II court's
reasoning in dismissing each of the claims, see infra notes 103-31 and accompanying text.
88. See id. at 807-08. By limiting its review of agency action to the record in
Wildlife Ass'n II, the Eighth Circuit continued the Supreme Court trend of "record
review". See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 807-08. For a discussion of the "record
review" trend, see supra notes 45-65 and accompanying text.
89. See id. at 807 (concluding "the district court did not abuse its discretion by
conducting its judicial review on the voluminous administrative record compiled
by the Forest Service for the four timber sales") (citations omitted).
90. See id. at 807 (holding district court "properly excluded the Wildlife Association's voluminous evidence . . . because its lawsuit challenges the Forest Ser-
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Circuit dismissed Wildlife Association's two challenges to record review under NEPA, and the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the
Clean Water Act, collectively.9 1 Finally, the court dismissed Wildlife
Association's six statutory-based claims against the Forest Service on
the grounds that nothing in the administrative record proved that
the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously under APA standard of
92
review.

A.

Standard of Review Limited to the Record

The Eighth Circuit characterized Wildlife Association's appeal
as a cause of action for APA review. 9 3 Following three major
Supreme Court decisions, the Eighth Circuit established three principles in limiting judicial review to the administrative record in
Wildlife Ass'n I.94 First, following Camp v. Pitts,9 5 the court noted

that APA review of agency action is normally limited to the administrative record. 9 6 Second, under the ruling in Florida Power & Light
vice's timber sales decisions, not post-sale activities implementing the sales").
Wildlife Association argued that its extrinsic should be admitted under the bad
faith exception because of the discrepancy between the actual, environmentally
damaging logging and road construction and that activity studied in the EA's. See
id. at 807-08. The Eighth Circuit notes that the Forest Service "emphatically denies" the discrepancy asserted by plaintiffs, but cites no authority for its exclusion
of post-sale evidence produced by appellants. Id. at 808.
91. See WildlifeAssn II, 141 F.3d at 808 (citing NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1994);
ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (1994); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1)
(1994)). For a discussion of the Eighth Circuit's analysis and a critic focusing on
its NEPA analysis, see infra notes 107-16, 121-26, 135-45 and accompanying text.
92. See id. at 808-811. For a discussion of the six claims and the court's analysis, see infra notes 103-31 and accompanying text.
93. See id. at 807. APA's standard of review states that a final agency action
may be put aside if it is "'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law.'" Id. (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414-15 (1971)). Wildlife Association claimed that the Forest Service violated at least six federal statutes. See id. The Eighth Circuit declared,
however, that the appeal dealt "primarily with a single cause of action for APA
review-not, as the Wildlife Association pleaded, with multiple statutory claims for
relief." Wildlife Ass'n I, 141 F.3d at 807.
94. See id. (citing Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973); Florida Power &
Light Co.v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414-15, 420 (1971)).
95. 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
96. See WildlifeAss'n II, 141 F.3d at 807 (citing Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142
(1973)). In Camp, the plaintiffs challenged the Comptroller of Currency's action
to deny authorization of a new bank in South Carolina. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S.
138, 138-39 (1973). The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals inappropriately found that the administrative record was insufficient for adequate judicial
review and the case should be remanded to the district court for a de novo trial. Id.
at 139-40, 142. Instead, the Court determined that "the focal point for judicial
review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new
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Co. v. Lorion,9 7 the Eighth Circuit stressed that, under proper procedure, it should remand to the agency for additional investigation
except in rare circumstances. 98 And, third, following Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe 99 the Wildlife Ass'n II court determined that Wildlife Association should make "a strong showing of
bad faith or improper behavior by the Forest Service" in order to
persuade the court to review extrinsic evidence at the appeal of a
final agency action. 100 The Eighth Circuit rejected Wildlife Association's three challenges to strict record review in accordance with
these principles. 10 1
record made initially in the reviewing court" when applying APA's "arbitrary and
capricious" standard to agency decisions. Id. at 142.
97. 470 U.S. 729 (1985).
98. See Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. Rogers, 141 F.3d 803, 807 (8th Cir.
1998) (citing Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985)). In
Lorion, the Court reiterated Camp's holding that APA review should focus on the
administrative record before the agency at the time its decision is made. Florida
Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743 (1985). The Court concluded that
"[t]he factfinding capacity of the district court is thus typically unnecessary tojudicial review of agency decisionmaking." Id. at 744. Thus, Lorion established a general rule of restricting judicial review of agency decisions to the administrative
record. See French, supra note 1, at 943 (discussing the lack of Court's concern in
Lorion, Camp and Overton Park about agencies' abilities to develop adequate record
for judicial review).
99. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
100. Id. at 420. For a general discussion of Overton Park,see supra notes 37-44
and accompanying text. See also Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 807 (noting Eighth
and Seventh Circuits follow Overton Park ruling in Maxey v. Kradrovach, 890 F.2d
73, 77 (8th Cir. 1989), and Cronin v. United States Dep't of Agric., 919 F.2d 439,
444 (1990), respectively).
101. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 807-808. The first challenge to record
review concerned the bad faith exception laid out in Overton Park. See id. Wildlife
Association argued that the bad faith exception was invoked because of the discrepancy between the environmental harm of the actual sales and lesser harm of
the activity studied in the EAs. See id. Without discussion of its analysis, the Wildlife
Ass'n H court stated that appellants' "threshold showing of bad faith [was] woefully
inadequate to justify going outside the administrative record." Id. at 808. The
threshold showing of bad faith must be strong according to the Supreme Court.
See Overton Park,401 U.S. at 420. To reach the conclusion that appellants' showing
of bad faith on the part of the Forest Service was inadequate, the court placed
considerable weight on the volume of the record. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at
807. While mentioning the "voluminous administrative record" several times
throughout the opinion, the court's logic proceeded to conclude that the record
was, therefore, complete and adequately considered all of the issues on appeal. See
id. at 807-809.
The second challenge concerned the alleged violation of NEPA by failing to
consider all relevant environmental factors. See id. at 808. The court rejected the
contention on two grounds. First, the outside evidence concerned "post-sale implementation activity." Id. The Wildlife Ass'n II court quoted precedent in saying
that its task during record review "'is
to make sure the Forest Service considered
the information available at the time it made its decision; if the agency's decision
was proper at the time it was made, our inquiry is at an end."' Id. (quoting Lockhart v. Kenops, 927 F.2d 1028, 1036 (8th Cir. 1991)). Second, Wildlife Association

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999

23

570
B.

Villanova Environmental
Law Journal, Vol.
10, JOURNAL
Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 7 [Vol.
VILLANOVA
ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW

X: p. 547

No Finding of Arbitrariness in the Record

After adopting strict record review of the Forest Service's approval of the timber sales, the Eighth Circuit analyzed the decision
under the arbitrary and capricious standard set out in APA. 10 2 The
Wildlife Ass'n II court found no evidence of arbitrariness when reviewing the record under six substantive federal statutes. 10 3 Thus,
the court dismissed the claims, stressing that Wildlife Association
pointed .to nothing in the administrativerecord that proved arbitrariness or capriciousness on the part of the Forest Service in assessing
04
and approving the timber sales.'

failed to justify why expert opinions and studies were not offered to the agency
during its decision making process. See Wildlife Ass'n I, 141 F.3d at 808 (citing
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 553-54 (1978) (interpreting NEPA as procedural).
Before reaching its conclusion, the Eighth Circuit expressly failed to consider
the Second Circuit's NEPA exception to strict record review. See id. (citing National Audubon Soc'y v. Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7, 14-16 (2d Cir. 1997) and County of
Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1384-85 (2d Cir. 1977)). The
Eighth Circuit states, "[w]e need not decide whether to adopt the Second Circuit's
view that courts should be more willing to go outside the administrative record in
considering NEPA challenges." Id. The Wildlife Ass'n II court apparently decided
not to consider the Second Circuit's view because appellants were trying to bring
in evidence of post-sale environmental impact. See id. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's view, see supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
The final challenge to the Forest Service's approval of the four timber sales,
based on ESA and the Clean Water Act, alleged that evidence outside of the record
should be admitted because the citizen-suit provisions of the Acts were invoked.
See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 808 (citing citizen-suit provisions § 1 5 4 0(g) (1) of
ESA and § 1365 (a) (1) of Clean Water Act). The Wildlife Ass'n II court disagreed,
saying that while "these statutes provide for judicial review ... [they] do not prescribe a standard for that review." Id. The Eighth Circuit, therefore, adopted the
Supreme Court's reasoning: "'where Congress has simply provided for review,
without setting forth the standards to be used or the procedures to be followed,
this Court has held that consideration is to be confined to the administrative record and that no de novo proceeding may be held."' Id. (quoting United States v.
Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 715 (1963)).
102. See id. at 807-08 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A)). For a discussion of the
arbitrary and capricious standard in general, see supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
103. See id. at 808-811 (enumerating six statutes that Wildlife Association argued Forest Service violated: (1) Wild & Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA), (2) National
Forest Management Act (NFMA), (3) National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
(4) Clean Water Act, (5) Wilderness Act, and (6) Endangered Species Act (ESA)).
The Eighth Circuit stated that Wildlife Association "persistently fail[ed] to relate
those arguments to the standard of judicial review set forth in the Administrative
Procedure Act .

. . ."

Wildlife Ass'n 11, 141 F.3d at 807.

104. See id. at 808-11 (stating for each claim, Forest Service considered issue in
administrative record and reached decision of FONSI).
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WSRA Considered

Wildlife Association argued that the Forest Service violated its
duties under WSRA in two ways: both to protect the quality of water
in the wilderness area and to cooperate with the Secretary of Interior and proper State agencies to eliminate or diminish water pollution in Buffalo River. 10 5 The Wildlife Ass'n II court rejected the first
argument because it determined that the EAs adequately discussed
the impact of the sales on Buffalo River and Richland Creek, and
10 6
called for protective mitigation measures of the affected waters.
In addition, the court rejected the second argument, finding that
the Forest Service did not fail to cooperate with appropriate state
10 7
water pollution control agencies.
2. NFMA Considered
Wildlife Association asserted four specific violations of the
Ozark National Forest Plan and EIS as amended in 1991.108 The
Eighth Circuit deemed all violations "relatively insignificant issues,"
none of which "comes close to establishing that approval of the
sales are arbitrary or capricious." 10 9 The court characterized the
issues raised as insignificant because (1) the Forest Service ex-

plained in the record that the requirements in the Plan should be

105. Id. at 809. The appellants specifically alleged that the Forest Service
failed "to protect the water quality of designated segments of the Buffalo River and
Richland Creek, and to 'cooperate with the Secretary of the Interior and with the
appropriate State water pollution control agencies for the purpose of eliminating
or diminishing the pollution of waters of the river.'" Id. (quoting WRSA, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1283(c)(1994)).
106. See id. at 808-09 (looking to Wildlife Association to prove record established that "the Forest Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finding that
logging and road work will have an insignificant effect on WSRA-designated river
components").
107. Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 809 (declining to hold Forest Service failed
to cooperate solely because Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology and Arkansas Natural and Scenic Rivers Commission opposed sales). The
Eighth Circuit adds that "[t]he record reflects that the Forest Service considered
the State's objections even though they were not expressed until after the comment period ended." Id.
108. See id. (noting four inconsistencies: "(1) failed to timely make available
an inventory map of all forest roads with their management objectives; (2) failed to
designate "Special Interest" areas; (3) increased net logging road mileage within
the Forest; and (4) authorized road construction and logging within 198 feet of
the Highlands Trail").
109. Id. For a discussion of the arbitrary or capricious analysis, see supra notes
34-44 and accompanying text.
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viewed as "forest-wide" concepts, and (2) the sales only encompassed a small area of Ozark National Forest. 110
3.

NEPA Considered

The Wildlife Ass'n II court based its analysis of the Forest Service's EIS and EAs on two principles initially adopted by the Eighth
Circuit in Sierra Club v. United States Forest Serv. 11 I First, the Wildlife
Ass'n II court stated, "[w] e 'must affirm if we find the Service took a
"hard look" at the project, identified the relevant areas of environmental concern, and made a convincing statement for its
FONSI.'"112 Second, the court recognized that "'[a]n EA cannot
be both concise and brief and provide detailed answers for every
question.'

"111

The Wildlife Ass'n II court used these principles to dismiss Wildlife Association's claim that the Forest Service should prepare an
EIS for the site-specific timber sales, in addition to the Forest Plan
EIS. 1 14 The court also determined that the Forest Service's EAs pre110. See id., 141 F.3d at 809 (providing following example of typical Forest
Service explanation: "Forest Plan's requirement of no net increase in logging
roads is a forest-wide concept, and the four sales in question involve less than ten
miles of new road and reconstruction of less than twenty miles of road").
111. 46 F.3d 835 (8th Cir. 1995).
112. Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 809 (quoting Sierra Club v. United States
Forest Serv., 46 F.3d 835, 838-39 (8th Cir. 1995)). The Eighth Circuit in Wildlife
Ass'n II is applying one of the four factors that the District of Columbia Circuit
listed "to be considered in determining whether an agency's decision to forego an
EIS is arbitrary and capricious: (1) whether the agency took a 'hard look' at the
problem." 977 F.2d 428, 434 (8th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
113. Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 809 (quoting Sierra Club, 46 F.3d at 840).
This second principle applied by the Wildlife Ass'n II court calls into question the
proper interpretation of 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)-(b). See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)-(b)
(1998) (calling for EA to be both "brief" and "sufficient"). According to the Wildlife Ass'n II court, "sufficient" means that the Forest Service's EAs "considered" issues raised by Wildlife Association. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 809-11.
Commentators, such as Weinberg, however, urge courts to review agency actions
beyond mere consideration of the agencies' findings of environmental impact and
assess the finding's accuracy and agency's mitigation efforts. See Weinberg, supra
note 21, at 101.
114. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 809 (concluding EAs sufficient in meeting
NEPA standards prior to timber sales). The Wildlife Ass'n II court, although
"[r]ecognizing that federal agencies must study cumulative environmental impacts
and prepare comprehensive EIS's when appropriate" nonetheless concluded the
agency properly used its power of discretion in determining no further EIS was
needed because "the Forest Service's EAs were not arbitrary or capricious compliance with its NEPA obligations in making [the] timber sale decisions." Id.
Thus, the court found appellants' claim that NEPA required a second EIS to
be prepared specifically for the timber sales in order to assess the cumulative effects of the sales to be without merit. See id. The Eighth Circuit's decision follows
the Supreme Court's ruling in Kleppe v. Sierra Club. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427
U.S. 390, 410-14 (1976) (holding NEPA does not require second EIS if Forest Ser-
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pared for each timber sale analyzed the cumulative effects of the
15
timber sales on wildlife, fish and watershed resources adequately."
Again, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the Forest Service did not
arbitrarily or capriciously fail to comply with NEPA regulations because the administrative record considered cumulative impacts and
forest management issues for the whole forest. 11 6
4.

Clean Water Act Considered

The Wildlife Ass'n H court quickly dismissed Wildlife Association's Clean Water Act claims.' 17 First, the appellants' alleged that
the Forest Service failed to obtain required permits to reduce timber sale pollution.1 18 Second, Wildlife Association asserted that the
timber sales violated the Clean Water Act because they were contrary to the state's antidegradation policy.11 9 The Eighth Circuit
simply concluded that the Forest Service's record showed that the
vice's EAs conclude FONSI); see also, Sierra Club v. United States Forest Serv., 46

F.3d 835, 838-40 (8th Cir. 1995) (discussing Forest Service requirements to prepare Forest Plan EIS and EAs).
For a discussion of the special circumstances that exist in the NEPA process of
preparing EISs and EAs when the Forest Service must also comply with NFMA, see
supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
115. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 809 (stating following three reasons for
Forest Service's compliance with NEPA: "[Il Each timber sale EA is over one hundred pages long and is 'tiered' to the Forest Plan EIS . . . [2] [w]hile the EA's do
not cross reference each other, each expressly addresses cumulative environment
impact . . . [3] [t]he EAs study areas significantly larger than the area to be
logged").
116. See id. (holding because administrative record contained national Forest
Plan and accompanying EIS for Ozark National Park, it reflected Forest Service's
adequacy in assessing cumulative environmental impact of proposed sales on
forest).
117. See id.
118. See id. at 810 (providing Wildlife Association's precise claim: "the Forest
Service failed to obtain necessary NPDES and dredge and fill permits for the discharges of pollutants that will accompany logging and road construction under the
timber sales"). The Eighth Circuit considered the following factors in determining
that the claim was "without merit": Wildlife Association did not cite to any authority for its claim under Clean Water Act; EPA did not intervene although the duty of
administering the permits lies with it; EPA did not include logging and road construction in the list of "point sources requiring NPDES permits" and both "are
exempt from dredge and fill requirements so long as construction and maintenance comply with best management practices." Id. Finally, the Wildlife Ass'n II
court stressed that "[t]he administrative record contains no evidence those practices have not been followed." Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 810 (emphasis added).
119. Id. The Wildlife Ass'n 1I court reasoned that the Forest Service's determination that the state law placed no additional obligations on the agency was not
arbitrary or capricious because the "Arkansas statewide policy for nonpoint sources
[logging and related road construction included] is so broadly stated." Id. at 810.
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agency did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in deciding not to
120
comply with state law.
5.

Wilderness Act Considered

Wildlife Association argued that the quality of the waters flowing through the wilderness areas would be degraded from logging
activity upstream.1 2 ' The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district
court's decision that Wilderness Association's argument ran
counter to section 7 of the Arkansas Wilderness Act because enjoining timber harvesting near the waterways would create protection areas or buffer zones, which are prohibited by the Act. 12 2 In
addition, the Eighth Circuit supported the Forest Service's determination that the timber sales would have no significant effect on the
water quality of the Buffalo River and Richland Creek. 23 Again,
the Wildlife Ass'n II court briefly reasoned that " It] he Wildlife Association points to nothing in the administrative record establishing
that this analysis was arbitrary or capricious.' 1 24
6. ESA Considered
Under ESA, Wildlife Association alleged three violations on the
Forest Service's part. 25 First, the Eighth Circuit reviewed the Forest Service's Biological Evaluations and EAs, and held that the sales
120. Id. The Eighth Circuit's reasoning under both allegations was notably
sparse. Id.
121. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 810. The Wildlife Association made this
argument even though the four timber sales were not located within the parts of
Ozark National Forest that the Arkansas Wilderness Act of 1984 designated as wilderness areas. See id.
122. See Arkansas Wilderness Act, PUB. L. No. 98-508, 98 STAT. 2349, 2352
(1984) (prohibiting creation of protection areas or buffer zones).
123. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 810. The Eighth Circuit states that the
Forest Service "thoroughly considered the effect of logging and road construction
on the water quality." Id. The Forest Plan "conclud[ed] that with mitigation measures and best management practices the impact on water quality would be insignificant." Id.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 810. First, appellants argued that the Forest Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously by approving the timber sales before the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service assessed the affect of logging in the specified area on any
species listed in the Act. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 810. Second, Wildlife
Association argued that EPA required the Forest Service to prepare biological "assessments" to decide whether to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service. See id.
811. Third, the Eighth Circuit also refuted Wildlife Association's claim under ESA,
which alleged that the Forest Service's assessment of the sales' impact on the bald
eagle was inadequate. See id.
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would have no effect on any listed endangered species. t 26 Accordingly, the court concluded that the Forest Service did not violate
ESA because it failed to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service
before approving the sales. 12 7 Second, the Eighth Circuit stated
that ESA only required the Forest Service to prepare biological assessments for "major construction activities." 12 8 Third, the Wildlife
Ass'n II court held that each EA, as provided in the record, adequately assessed the impacts of the sales on the bald eagle under
ESA. 129 Overall, the Eighth Circuit held that the Forest Service was
not "arbitrary or capricious" in carrying out its statutory obligations
because the administrative record considered each claim brought
130
by Wildlife Association.
V.

CRITicAL ANALysis

In Wildlife Ass'n II, the Eighth Circuit declared that judicial review of agency action is confined to the administrative record.13 1 In
so doing, the Eighth Circuit directly dismissed the Second Circuit's
trend, which allows for an exception to such strict record review in
NEPA cases. 132 The decision, in addition, affirmatively acknowl126. See id. According to the Eighth Circuit, "[a] finding of no effect obviates
the need for consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service." Id. (citing regulations to ESA, 50 C.F.R. § 402.14); see also Southwest Center for Biological Diversity
v. United States Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1447 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding Forest
Service's initial decision that salvage timber sale would have no effect on
threatened or endangered species of spotted owl, obviated need for formal consultation with Fish and Wildlife Service).
127. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 811.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id. Consistently throughout its opinion, the Eighth Circuit asserts
that the court's role in reviewing the record is to determine whether the agency
considered the challenged method. See id. Eighth Circuit reviewing courts, therefore, do not have the role of determining whether the record is correct. Wildlife
Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 811. See also United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709
(1963) (determining "where Congress has simply provided for, without setting
forth the standards to be used or the procedures to be followed, this Court has
held that consideration is to be confined to the administrative record and that no
de novo proceeding may be held."); Cabinet Mountains Wilderness/ Scotchman's
Peak Grizzly Bears v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 685-86 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (concluding
Forest Service's analysis of proposed action qualified as imposition of specific mitigation measures to address concerns and supported decision not to prepare EIS).
The District of Columbia Circuit also held appropriate standard of review under
ESA is arbitrary and capricious, not de novo. See id.
131. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 807 (affirming district court's decision to
conduct judicial review on administrative record). For a discussion of the appellate court's reasoning, see supra, notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
132. See id. at 808 (reasoning Second Circuit's view does not apply because
Wildlife Association tried to admit evidence of environmental impact after sales
were approved). Wildlife Association also attempted to admit expert opinions and

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999

29

576

Villanova Environmental
Law Journal, LAW
Vol. 10,JouRNAL
Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 7[Vol. X: p. 547
ENVIRONMENTAL
VILLANOVA

edged the Seventh Circuit's narrow approach to NEPA cases 133 and,
consequently, reaffirmed the Eighth Circuit's dismissal of extrinsic
evidence.13 4 The Wildlife Ass'n II court's analysis was insufficient,
however, because the accuracy of the Forest Service's findings was
35
never analyzed.'
In failing to assess the accuracy of the Forest Service's administrative record by reviewing the record's findings in light of extrinsic
studies analyzing the environmental impact of the sales known during the Forest
Service's decision making process, as well as evidence of reasonable alternatives to
the sales that the Forest Service did not consider. See id. Reasoning that "the Association failed to provide adequate justification for its failure to present those
materials to the agency during its decision-making process," the Wildlife Ass'n H
court quickly disregards the Second Circuit's view that extra-record evidence
should be introduced on judicial review an agency's decision. Id. (citing Vermont
Yankee, 435 U.S. 519, 553-54). For a discussion of the Second Circuit's view exemplified by the County of Suffolk decision, see supra notes 66-73 and accompanying
text.
133. See id. at 807 (citing Cronin to support view that supplementation of administrative record can occur only upon showing of bad faith or improper behavior). See also, Cronin v. United States Dep't of Agric., 919 F.2d 439, 444 (7th Cir.
1990) (allowing supplementation of administrative record only in emergency situations); French, supra note 1, at 930 (discussing narrow trend of Seventh Circuit to
restrict judicial review of agency action to administrative record.
134. See Wildlife Ass'n Hat 808. In several NEPA cases prior to Wildlife Ass'n II,
the Eighth Circuit allowed extra-record evidence review without requiring an
emergency situation. For a list of Eighth Circuit cases allowing extrinsic evidence,
see supra note 63. Since Wildlife Ass'n II, however, the two cases concerningjudicial
review of an agency action have confined review to the administrative record and
in so doing, cited Wildlife Ass'n II. See, e.g., Gregson v. United States Forestry Serv.,
19 F. Supp. 2d 925, 928, 931-932 (citing Wildlife Ass'n H heavily). For a brief discussion of the Gregson decision, see supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
135. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 808 (stating "'[t] his court's task is to make
sure the Forest Service considered the information available at the time it made its
decision; if the agency's decision was proper at the time it was made, our inquiry is
at an end.'") (quoting Lockhart v. Kenops, 927 F.2d 1028, 1036 (8th Cir. 1991).
The Eighth Circuit interprets the word "proper" in the quote above as merely considering the information. See id. at 808-811. "Proper" could also carry the connotation of accuracy and completeness, as the Second Circuit held in County of Suffolk.
See County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1372-73 (2d Cir. 1977)
(holding EIS and accompanying document inadequate).
The Eighth Circuit's conclusion not to accept Wildlife Association's expert
analysis is not necessarily incorrect. The Wildlife Ass'n II court rejected the evidence based upon the accepted principle that courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the agency, and Wildlife Association's failure to explain why its
evidence was not presented to the Forest Ser'.ice at the time of decision-making.
See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 808; Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 420 (1991) (discussing review of record before Secretary at time decision
was made).
The Eighth Circuit has arguably ignored its responsibility under NEPA to ensure that the Forest Service based its decision on relevant factors and benefit to the
environment. SeeWeinberg, supra note 21, at 108-110 (arguing courts are acting in
contradiction to Congressional intent in NEPA if fail to analyze policy in judicial
review of agency action). For a discussion of these procedural and substantive
requirements prescribed by NEPA, see supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol10/iss2/7

30

1999]

Tuozzolo:
Newton County
WildlifeWILDLIFE
Association v.ASSOCIATION
Rogers: Who Is Taking a Har
COUNTY
NEWTON

evidence, the Eighth Circuit quickly decided that the Forest Service's assessment of the timber sales complied with NEPA's procedural requirements. 1 36 If the court in Wildlife Ass'n II had
considered the record's accuracy in terms of both the environmental affect of the timber sales and mitigating alternatives, it would
have complied with NEPA's purpose, namely Congress's intent in
enacting NEPA as a check on agency action that fails to promote
the Act's environmental goals. 137 Instead, the court ignored
NEPA's principles when determining whether the Forest Service's
record followed the procedural requirements of the Act.13 8 The
Wildlife Ass'n II court, therefore, simply did not take a hard, critical
look at the administrative record to determine whether it was a true
assessment of the timber sales' environmental impact and mitigat13 9
ing alternatives.
A.

The Purpose of NEPA and the Wildlife Ass'n II Decision

Arguably, the Forest Service did not violate any procedural provisions in NEPA. 140 The Eighth Circuit, however, erred in determining that the administrative record was adequate simply because
the Forest Service complied with the Act's procedural requirements.' 4 ' The Wildlife Ass'n II court considered two aspects of the
136. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 809 (reasoning Forest Service's issuance
of Forest Plan EIS and FONSIs after preparing EAs was evidence enough NEPA
was followed). For a discussion of the court's brief analysis of appellants' NEPA
claim, see supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
137. For a discussion of NEPA's goals, see supranotes 21-22, 45-50 and accompanying text.
138. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 809 (discussing only Forest Service's process of preparing Forest Plan EIS and individual EAs).
139. Cf Weinberg, supra note 21, at 109 (arguing courts must evaluate both
environmental impact and mitigating alternatives when assessing agencies'
decisions).
140. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 809 (reasoning Forest Plan EIS and individual EAs consider cumulative effects of challenged timber sales without EIS for
timber sales). The Eighth Circuit determined that the EAs are adequate because
"each EA is over one hundred pages long ... and is consistent with the policy
behind 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20 to save money and time by avoiding repetitive inquires." Id.
Forest Service compliance with NEPA is closely connected with NFMA, as discussed in Part II of this Note. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text. Accordingly, the Wildlife Ass'n H court held that the Forest Service complied with
NFMA's procedural provisions as well as NEPA. See Wildlife Ass' I, 141 F.3d at 809
(discussing claim under NFMA). For a discussion of the Wildlife Ass'n II court's
decision not to require the Forest Service to prepare a second EIS, see supra notes
112-17 and accompanying text.
141. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 809 (discussing only procedural requirements in NEPA with respect to EIS, EAs and FONSI). NEPA, however, is not only a
procedural statute according to its legislative history; its provisions clearly state en-
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record in determining the Forest Service's compliance with NEPA:
(1) the record's volume 142 and (2) the fact that the record considered the concerns raised by the appellants. 143 In short, the court
concluded that the sheer volume of the record weighed substantially in showing ample preparation of the EIS and EAs and, thus,
44
consideration of any challenges to the timber sales.'
The court's determination that the record was complete does
not necessarily follow from the apparently thorough process of
studies and notices the Forest Service conducted in Ozark National
Park. 145 In other words, a thorough procedural process does not
vironmental goals the agencies are required to advance. See Weinberg, supra note
21, at 101. For a discussion of NEPA's purpose, see supra notes 21-22, 45-50 and
accompanying text.
142. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 807, 809 (suggesting sheer volume of
record was enough to show Forest Service adequately considered environmental
impact and alternatives to timber sales in light of any challenge, and EAs, each
over one hundred pages long, were adequate to show cumulative effects of timber
sales). Many courts mention the length of the record before a brief analysis of
procedural compliance with NEPA. See, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lotion,
470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985) (noting 547-page record was compiled); Missouri Coalition for Env't v. Corps of Eng'rs, 866 F.2d 1025, 1033 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating
"[t]he sheer volume of the administrative record in this case is evidence that the
[agency] gave environmental effects the type of consideration required under
NEPA.") (citing Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 98
(1983)); Gregson v. United States Forestry Serv., 19 F. Supp. 2d 925, 928 (E.D. Ark.
1998) (noting three-volume record was reviewed).
But see, Sierra Club v. Hassell, 636 F.2d 1095, 1097-98 (5th Cir. 1981) (reviewing extrinsic evidence to assess accuracy of agency's decision not to prepare EIS
despite "voluminous administrative records"); see also Goodman, supra note 1, at
118 (arguing volume of record does not equal accuracy and Forest Service often
used reasoning above to its advantage in preparing substantively inadequate assessments of timber sales).
143. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 808 (stating court's role in review of
agency's administrative record is to determine whether agency considered issues
raised by appellants, not whether agency's findings were accurate). See also, Missouri Coalition,866 F.2d at 1033 (noting "the question is whether an agency 'considered' environmental effects, not the 'correctness' of the decision") (citing
Olmstead Citizens for a Better Community v. United States, 793 F.2d 201, 207 (8th
Cir. 1986)).
144. See WildlifeAss'n II, 141 F.3d at 808-11 (basing reasoning on premise that
voluminous record and mere consideration show adequacy of findings in EAs).
For a discussion of the court's brief analysis of appellants' statutory claims, see
supra notes 103-31 and accompanying text.
145. See Goodman, supra note 1, at 118 (contending "[a]lthough [forest
plans] have taken years and tremendous resources to develop, they have failed to
alleviate the problems that precipitated the passage of [ ] NFMA"). Most importantly, in Wildlife Ass'n II, the Forest Service's determination of FONSI after developing an EA for each sale may have been inaccurate when assessed in the light of
either the cumulative environmental impact of the sales, for which an EIS was
never prepared, or the opposing evidence of negative environmental impact from
appellants' expert affidavits and opinions. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 809 (discussing court's determination that administrative record was complete under
NEPA requirements). If the Wildlife Ass'n II court determined that FONSIs were
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necessarily (and, in practice, not likely) ensure that an agency's record is not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with the law."'1 4 6 The Supreme Court's standard
of review does give great deference to agency decisions. 14 7 In
NEPA cases, however, courts should take a hard look at the accuracy of an agency's decision in light of opposing, extrinsic evidence
1 48
because only so doing will give effect to the purpose of NEPA.
NEPA's purpose and the Supreme Court's "hard look" doctrine direct the Wildlife Ass'n II court to allow appellants' to augment the Forest Service's administrative record.1 49 It is important,
in the face of an agency's duty to comply with both the procedure
and the purpose of NEPA, that the record's convincing statement
required by the "hard look" doctrine, ensures either that the action
an agency has taken is not against a valid environmental concern or
that the agency has taken steps to mitigate the concern.1 50 As the
County of Suffolk court stated, the only fair way to do so is to consider
either unsupported or not fully supported, a second EIS might be required under
NEPA. Moreover, an injunction probably would have been issued against the Forest Service to stop timber sales while the EIS was prepared. See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y v. Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7, 17 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding "Forest Service
violated NEPA by failing to adequately consider all relevant environmental factors
prior to making its [FONSI]" and hoping that its holding "will ensure that such
agencies in NEPA cases propose mitigation measures supported by studies and/or
procedures to monitor their effectiveness").
146. See id. at 17-19. Cf Goodman, supra note 1, at 119 (suggesting Forest
Service bias toward timber sales and record of bad faith, combined with strict judicial record review, amounts to widespread abuse of agency discretion by following). For a discussion of the history of Forest Service bias and bad faith, see infra
notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
147. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
The terms "arbitrary" and "capricious" are not usually defined by court opinions
relying upon APA standard of review. Instead, courts simply reason that the administrative record's consideration of challenges raised by appellants is far from
arbitrary or capricious. See, e.g., Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 808-11. For a discussion of the APA standard as applied by the Supreme Court, see supra notes 34-44
and accompanying text.
148. See Weinberg, supra note 21, at 113-16 (urging Congress and Court to
establish rule of judicial review of agency action that will effectuate purpose of
NEPA).
149. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 807. For a discussion of the "arbitrary or
capricious" standard and record review, see supra notes 34-73 and accompanying
text.
150. See, e.g., Envtl. Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 353 (8th
Cir. 1972) (stating "[c]ourts have an obligation to review substantive agency decisions on the merits to determine if they are in accord with NEPA. . . [including]
whether the actual balance of costs and benefits struck by the agency according to
these [NEPA-imposed] standards . . .clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental factors.") (citing Envtl. Defense Fund v. Corps. of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 298-300
(8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973)).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999

33

580

VILLANOVA
Villanova Environmental
Law Journal, Vol.
10,JouRNAL
Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 7[Vol.
ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW

the accuracy of the record
151
evidence.
B.

X: p. 547

in light of opposing, extrinsic

Bad Faith and Judicial Deference to the Forest Service in
Wildlife Ass'n II

Not only did the Wildlife Ass'n II court ignore NEPA's purpose
in reviewing the Forest Service's administrative record, but the
court also erred in ignoring the Forest Service's history of bad faith
and bias toward timber sales. 15 2 Although the Eighth Circuit correctly assumed that the Forest Service is authorized to determine
how timber sales will impact the environment, 153 the court too
quickly presumed that the Forest Service did not abuse its discretion in approving the timber sales. 15 4 By examining procedural
compliance only, reviewing courts, like the Wildlife Ass'n II court,
place little pressure on agencies to check the accuracy of their findings when preparing the prescribed statements. 155
In fact, in Wildlife Ass'n II and other similar cases, the Forest
Service has practically no check on its administrative agency author151. See County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1368 (2d
Cir. 1977). For a discussion of the County of Suffolk decision and its influence on
the trend to admit extrinsic evidence in NEPA challenges to agency actions, see
supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
152. See generally Goodman, supra note 1, at 133-36 (discussing Forest Service's
history of bad faith and bias toward timber sales).
153. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d 807 (acknowledging "[i]f the agency record
is for some reason inadequate, 'the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is
to remand to the agency for additional investigation'") (citing Florida Power &
Light v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985)). For a discussion of judicial deference
to agency power, see supra note 1 and accompanying text. The Forest Service is
presumed to have specific knowledge of the environmental impact of timber sales.
See French, supra note 1, at 958-965 (arguing that many administrative agencies in
fact are not as knowledgeable concerning technical and scientific matters as are
experts, who appellants attempt to introduce during judicial review).
154. See generally WildlfeAss'n II, 141 F.3d at 807 (reasoning, throughout analysis of Forest Service's compliance with NEPA, that "voluminous" record is complete because many environmental factors and alternatives were considered). For
a discussion of the Eighth Circuit's brief analysis of the claims brought against the

Forest Service, see supra notes 103-31 and accompanying text.
Courts have allowed the Forest Service almost unlimited discretion in approving timber sales. See Goodman, supra note 1, at 155. Judicial review of the Forest
Service's records in light of extrinsic evidence can be an important check on the
agencies' power and on its compliance with NEPA. See id. at 137 (arguing NFMA
enacted as check on abuse of agency power and Forest Service has violated Act's
purpose by overriding environmental concerns when approving timber sales).
155. See French, supra note 1, at 957-58 (pointing out that if there are no
protests to agency action, administrative records assumed to be complete and
accurate).
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ity.1 5 6

The impact of this practically unlimited discretion has led to
the Forest Service repeatedly favoring industry at the expense of the
environment. 157 If the Wildlife Ass'n II court considered such bias
and bad faith, perhaps Wildlife Association could have been
awarded a preliminary injunction to stop the timber sales while the
or, more
merits of its claims were remanded to the Forest15 Service
8
appropriately, considered by the Eighth Circuit.
VI.

IMPACT

The Supreme Court has left open the crucial question as to
whether judicial review of agency action should be limited to the
administrative record.1 5 9 When courts follow the Seventh Circuit's
view of strict record review in cases dealing with the Forest Service,
as the Eighth Circuit did in Wildlife Ass'n II, judges are often blind
to the actual environmental impact of agency-approved projects,
such as timber sales. 160 In addition, as illustrated in Part V of this
Note, courts following strict record review ignore NEPA's purpose
and the history of agency bad faith. 1 61 Such ignorance results in
two detrimental effects: (1) pressure is placed on environmental
groups and individuals, instead of the Forest Service, to challenge
the accuracy of the agency's findings during the planning and ap156. See, e.g., Cronin v. United States Dep't of Agric., 919 F.2d 439, 444 (7th
Cir. 1990) (limiting district court to record compiled by agency because agency
appropriate place to consider evidence). The facts in the record are, therefore,
assumed to be true. See, Missouri Coalition for Env't v. Corps of Eng'rs, 866 F.2d
1025, 1033 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating not role of court to determine truth of agency's
findings). Thus, the only restrictions on the agency are to guess what topics
should be considered in case of protest. See French, supra note 1, at 958 (criticizing courts that will not sit as fact-finders or allow appellants to present facts inconsistent with agency's administrative record).
157. See Goodman, supra note 1, at 133-36, 147-55 (summarizing in detail
three major Forest Service biases, including local community bias, timber industry
bias, budget maximizing bias, as well as bad faith in appeals process). For a discussion of the comment process, see supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
158. See WildlifeAss'n II, 141 F.3d at 806-07 (affirming district court's denial of
preliminary injunction and noting seventy-five percent of logging and road construction completed by appeal). It is proper course, the Eighth Circuit notes, to
remand to agency for additional investigation if the record is somehow inadequate. See Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744. Of course, some courts would first conduct
minimal judicial fact-finding by allowing extrinsic evidence from the party seeking
the injunction to determine whether such further agency investigation is needed.
See generally County of Suffolk, 562 F.2d at 1368.
159. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's trend toward strict record review, see supra note 3744, 50 and accompanying text.
160. See Wildlife Ass'n II, 141 F.3d at 807 (ignoring expert opinions that environmental effects and alternatives not thoroughly considered by Forest Service).
161. For a critique of courts that ignore NEPA's purpose and a discussion of
Forest Service Bad Faith, see supra notes 132-59 and accompanying text.
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proval process, 162 and (2) injunctions against potentially harmful

timber sales will continue to be denied without proof of accurate
163
environmental impact.
First, courts refusing to admit extrinsic evidence except in
emergency situations or when the record obviously lacks content do
not assure the Forest Service will make thorough findings. 6 4 Thus,
not only do logging activities continue in the face of strong public
contest to negative environmental impact, 16 5 but such courts also,
in effect, shift the burden of accurate assessment of timber sales to
environmental groups and individuals who protest agency actions. 166 This court-imposed burden on the public runs counter to
Congress's stated purpose in NEPA and will continue to discredit
67
protecting the national environment as the Act intends.'
Second, the Supreme Court could help prevent much environmental damage caused by deficient agency process by establishing a
162. See French, supra note 1, at 976-83 (arguing burden on appellants challenging agency actions to ensure studies completed during decision-making process). For a discussion of the burden placed on challengers of the Forest Service's
actions in particular, see supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Gregson v. United States Forestry Serv., 19 F. Supp. 2d 925, 928
(E.D. Ark. 1998) (denying appellants' injunction by relying on Wildlife Ass'n lI's
adoption of strict record review).
164. See French, supra note 1, at 976-83 (arguing reviewing courts should have
burden of examining accuracy of agencies' findings with extrinsic evidence
presented in court); Goodman, supra note 1, at 119 (concluding courts should
actively review citizen appeals of agency decisions and allow appellants to augment
administrative record).
165. See Goodman, supra note 1, at 118-19. After Wildlife Ass'n II, the district
courts in the Eighth Circuit have failed to grant injunctive relief to challengers of
Forest Service authorized timber sales. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying
text. See, e.g., Krichbaum v. U.S. Forest Service, 17 F. Supp. 2d 549 (W.D. Va. 1998)
(suggesting court will defer to agency's expertise and judgment); Heartwood, Inc.
v. U.S. Forest Service, Inc., 999 F.Supp. 1286 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (stating court's review of Forest Service's decision limited to review of record to determine whether
agency tool "'a hard look"' at environmental consequences of actions); House v.
U.S. Forest Service, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 974 F.Supp. 1022 (E.D. Ky. 1997)
(concluding defendant failed to take a hard look at the evidence; therefore,
agency finding was arbitrary and capricious).
166. See County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1385 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978) (noting that forcing plaintiffs to
prove alleged environmental impacts during the administrative process "would in
effect shift the burden of insuring the adequacy of the EIS to environmental challengers, even though the primary and nondelegable responsibility for providing
such analysis lies with the agency"). For a discussion of the County of Suffolk decision, see supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text. See also French, supra note 1, at
976-83 (discussing cyclical administrative process and courts' duty to review challengers' evidence extrinsic to administrative record in order to insure adequacy of
agencies' findings).
167. See Weinberg, supra note 21, passim (stressing Supreme Court thwarts
NEPA's purpose of imposing environmental responsibility on agencies).
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clear exception to record review for courts to follow in NEPA
cases. 168 Such a rule could potentially increase the number of injunctions awarded against timber sales until an objective, judicial
assessment of potential environmental impact is reached. 169 For
two reasons, it is critical to NEPA's purpose that an injunction is
ordered at the district court level when challengers of approved
timber sales bring suit against the Forest Service. First, exhaustion
of administrative remedies takes significant time, during which approved timber sales are not ceased by the Forest Service. 170 Second, by the time a court can determine whether an agency's
findings in approving a project indeed show ample steps (and,
hopefully, accuracy and mitigation) to protect the environment
171
from negative impact, the damage can be nearly complete.
Wildlife Ass'n II is clearly on point. By the time the second appeal reached the Eighth Circuit, seventy-five percent of the logging
and road construction had been completed. 72 The Eighth Circuit
even used this fact as a reason not to consider extrinsic evidence
when reviewing the record. 173 Clearly, the court never questioned
the truth of the Forest Service's findings even with knowledge that
opposing expert evidence existed. The court, therefore, completely deferred to the Forest Service in the face of adamant public
174
challenge, which lasted for over three years.
The decision in Wildlife Ass'n //demonstrates that courts need
a rule to assure judges will take a "hard look" at administrative
records on review in order to make sure agency findings are not
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law."1 75 If the Supreme Court continues, however,
to ignore the Congressional intent in NEPA, environmental groups
168. See cf id. at 104-108 (criticizing Court for ignoring Congress's clear intent that agencies mitigate environment impact of "major Federal actions").
169. See Froehlke, 473 F.2d at 353 n.18 (quoting Senator Jackson-"If an environmental policy is to become more than rhetoric, [c]oncern for environmental
quality must be a part of every phase of Federal action."). See 115 Cong. Rec.
29,087 (1969) (containing words of Senator Jackson, as quoted in Froehlke). See
also, Goodman, supra note 1, at 155 (arguing judicial review of Forest Service appeals meaningless if courts continue giving broad discretion to Forest Service).
170. See, e.g., Wildlife Ass'n I, 141 F.3d at 807 (suggesting process is long and
laborious). For Wildlife Ass'n H's procedural history, see supra note 83.
171. See, e.g., id. (noting seventy-five percent of project complete at time of
action).
172. See id. For a discussion of the facts of Wildlife Ass'n II, see supra notes 7488 and accompanying text.
173. See id.
174. See id. For a discussion of the Wildlife Ass'n II court's analysis, see supra
notes 89-131 and accompanying text.
175. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415; APA, U.S.C. 706(2) (A).
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and individuals concerned with environmental goals should challenge their legislatures to amend NEPA to make agency compliance
176
with its stated purpose mandatory.
Susan Gedrick Tuozzolo
176. See Weinberg, supra note 21, at 116 (asserting Congress or EPA should
"amend NEPA to require mitigation of environmental harms, thereby restoring
the statute's substantive component").
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